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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPl),
sometimes referred to as Micronesia (which means "tiny
islands"), is administered hy the United States as a
strategic trusteeship under the provisions of the United
Nations trusteeship system.
BACKGROUND
Micronesia's contact with the Western World
began in the sixteenth century when Spanish and Portugese
explorers, the first Westerners to enter the islands,
discovered the area.

Subsequent contacts came with

expeditions of explorers, traders, and whalers from
Britain, Germany, Russia, Japan, and the United States.
The nineteenth century conflict in the Western
Pacific between Germany, Spain, and Great Britain finally
resulted in German control over the Marshall Islands and
Spanish dominion over the Caroline Islands.

United States

involvement in the area officially began when Guam was
acquired as a result of its victory over Spain in the
Spanish-American War of 1898.

The Spanish presence ended

with the sale of the rest of its Pacific possessions to
Germany in 1899.
1
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The period of German administration (1899-1914)
saw the encouragement of trade and copra production.
Japan ended Germany’s hegemony at the beginning of World
War I by sending naval squadrons to the Marshall, Caroline,
and Mariana Islands.

In 1920 Japan’s administration was

formalized as the area became an International Mandate
within the League of Nations International Mandates System.
During World War II, Micronesia became a focal
point of military activity.

American administration of

the area began following Japan’s surrender in 1945.

By 1947

the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana Islands (except Guam)
had become a ’'strategic" trusteeship under the United
Nations Trusteeship System, with the United States desig-|
nated as the Administering Authority.
Many of the problems currently plaguing the United
States can be traced to the plpysical configuration of the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
vides a map of the trust territory.)

(Figure 1 pro

Encompassing a

vast three million square mile expanse of the Pacific
Ocean, an area as large as the continental United States,
Micronesia lies between 1 degree to 22 degrees north
latitude and 130 degrees to 170 degrees east longitude.
Of the 2,141 islands and atolls in the area, only 97
are inhabited.

The primary island groupings are the

Marshall Islands, the Caroline Islands, and the Mariana

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Figure 1
Map of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

Source:
United States, Department of State, 21st Annual Report to the United Rations
on the Administration of the Trust Territory of the"Tacifi'c 1slands. July I, 1'967‘ to
June 30, 1968 (Washington, D.O.:
Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 336.
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Islands.

Micronesia's total population was 114,645 in
2

1972, while the total land area is 701 square miles.
Population and land area distribution over the six
districts are shown in Table 1.

The largest island of

the Mariana chain, Guam, is an unincorporated territory
of the U.S. and hence is not a. part of the trust territory.'’
The primary political subdivisions of the territory are
six administrative districts:

Yap District, Mariana

Islands District, Palau District, Ponape District, Marshall
Islands District, and Truk District.
Table 1
land Area and Population Distribution in the Districts of
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

District

Land Area

Population

Truk District
46 square miles
Marshall Islands District.70
...........
Ponape District..
178
Palau District
178
Mariana Islands District.. 183 ...............
Yap District
46

32,732
24,248
23,723
13,025
13,381
7,536

Sources: United States, Department of State, 21st Annual
Report to the United Rations on the Administration of the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands' (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1969, p. 1; United States,
Department of State, 25th Annual Report to the United
Nations on the Administration of the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands (Washington, D.C.: Government Print
ing Office, 1973), p. 1.
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American administration of Micronesia has been
conducted by two agencies, the Department of the Navy
and the Department of the Interior.

At the outset,

the Navy was assigned both military and civilian admin
istrative responsibility for the entire trust territory.
But in 1953 the Department of the Interior was designated
to handle civil administration in Micronesia, with the
exception of Saipan and Tinian in the northern Marianas
which remained entirely under Naval jurisdiction.^

On

May 7, 1962 civilian administration was consolidated
under the Department of the Interior when Executive Order
Number 11021 relieved the Navy of the responsibility/ for
5
civilian administration of Saipan and Tinian.
MAJOR QUESTIONS
The basic contentions of this study are:

(l) that

despite its commitment to the principle of national selfdetermination, the United States has been remiss in
carrying out its responsibilities as the administrator of
the TTPI; and, (2) that military considerations or per
ceived requirements for U.S. national security have been
most influential in shaping U.S. policy in the trust
territory, that these considerations have probably
eliminated independence as an acceptable alternative for
Micronesia, and have largely determined the future status
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or form of association between Micronesia and the United
States.
The study will first examine the beginnings of the
trusteeship, noting especially the strategic and military
legacy of World War II which largely determined the
"strategic” nature of the relationship between the United
States and Micronesia.

What military actions of World

War II established Micronesia’s strategic'value in the
minds of U.S. policy-makers?

What were the positions of

the various Cabinet level agencies regarding the area’s
disposition after the War?

What were the positions taken

by the defense establishment on the one hand and the
civilian agencies (the Departments of the Interior and
State) on the other, and what emerged as the compromise
solution?

What exactly is a "strategic trusteeship"

and what are the obligations of the United States under
the United Nations Charter?
The next chapter will examine any progress the
United States has made in promoting "the political,
economic, social, and educational advancement of the
inhabitants of the Trust Territory, and their progressive
development toward self-government or independence."^
These goals were explicitly accepted bjr the United States
when it joined the U.N. and again in 1947 when it signed
the Trusteeship Agreement (in Article 6).

What have been

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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some of the specific achievements and failures of American
policy in the fields of political, economic, social, and
educational development?

What trends are discernible

in over-all U.S. policy toward Micronesia?
Following this evaluation of U.S. policy, the
investigation will turn to an assessment of the influence
which military and security considerations have had on
U.S. policy.

As the Cold War developed following World

War II, what U.S. military activities occurred in
Micronesia?

What developments resulted from the hirth

of the atomic and nuclear age?

Micronesia’s continuing

strategic significance has heen accentuated by such recent
developments in American foreign policy as the Mixon
Doctrine, announced by the President in July of 1969,
which promised a decreased U.S. military presence on the
Asian mainland.

What role could Micronesia be expected

to play, given a perceived need for alternative military
outposts?

Has the reversion of Okinawan sovereignty to

Japan contributed to a perceived need and, subsequently,
the strategic importance of Micronesia?

What role have

these military and security factors played in the U.S.Micronesian negotiations regarding the future political
status of the trust territory?
Chapter 5 will examine the wide range of options
regarding future political status which have been con-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

sidered by the Micronesians, ranging from the most
cautious, continuing the trusteeship, to the most farreaching, independence#

.Between these alternatives lay

free association and commonwealth status.

What kind of

relationship between the two sides is implied by each
proposal?

And what is the U.S. position on each?

Finally, an attempt will be made to assess the impact
of the military and security influence on the alternative
status which will finally be chosen.
The primary contribution of this study is partially
to fill a void in the research which has been conducted
concerning United States policy in Micronesia.

Most

work done in this area relates to specific aspects of
U.S. policy within a relatively brief time framework.
The material presented here will examine American policy
regarding political, economic, social, and educational
development over the entire trusteeship period.

Further

more, this study will indicate that, despite a limited'
detente between the East and the West on the international
scene, the U.S. military continues to have an impact on
U.S. foreign policy.
RELEVANT LITERATURE
The sources examined for this study examine U.S.
policy in general and military and security influences

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

on it.

Regarding U.S. polic};- in the fields of political,

economic, social, and educational development, the best
treatment is provided by articles in scholarly journals
(e *g* Foreign Affairs, Current History, Asian Survey).
However, these articles consider specific aspects of
U.S. policy within relatively short time periods.

Hence

the bulk of the information in this part of the stud}/ is
provided by primary sources, especially such government
documents as the annual reports provided by the United
States to the United Rations.
Military and security considerations in U.S.
policjr have been examined in some scholarly journals,
while newspaper and magazine articles provide the data
necessary to evaluate current developments.

The attitude

of the defense establishment is vital to this phase of
the study, and it has been discerned by examining
statements made by ranking members of the Armed Forces
and the Defense Department in newspapers, service publi
cations (e.g. Army and The Marine Corps Gazette), and
Congressional hearings.

Lastly, one important source

of data are the transcripts of negotiations betv/een
American and Micronesian representatives regarding the
future political status of the trust territory.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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APPROACH
The study of United States policy in Micronesia,
focusing on the strategic and military influences on it
is perhaps most amenable to traditional, descriptive
research techniques.

This study is not concerned with

constructing a theory or model of United StatesMicronesian relations.

Rather, it is an attempt to

determine what these relations are, and to analyze the
primary factors which affect them.
This is not to exclude quantitative data, however.
Charts and tables comparing various numerical data will
be used, especially in the description of political,
economic, social, and educational development.

But these

data are descriptive, not predictive.
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Chapter 2

MICRONESIA IN WORLD WAR II
This chapter will he concerned with the effect
American military actions in Micronesia during World
War II had on post-war strategic planning.

A "brief

description of action in the Pacific Theater will high
light the tremendous military significance of this area
for the U.S. war effort— and it provides insight as to
why the military establishment demanded some kind of
formal U.S. control of the islands.
Some of the heaviest fighting in the Pacific
Theater occurred in the Marshall and Mariana Islands.

The

initial phase of the American counterattack in the Pacific
began in Pebruary of 1942, when U.S. naval forces
bombarded Japanese fortifications and facilities on the
atolls of Wotje, Maleolap, Kwajalein, and Jaluit in the
■\
Taking heavy casualties, American forces

Marshalls.

continued head-on attacks directed toward various enemy
positions in the Pacific.

U.S. military planners intended

to capture islands in Micronesia to use as staging areas
and take-off points for attacks on other Japanese bases
2
and ultimately the home islands themselves.
In January
and Pebruary of 1943, the Marshall Islands were taken

12

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

after long and bloody ■battles.'5
Similar efforts by the American military were
directed at Guam, Saipan, and Tinian in the Marianas
group.

The intensity of the fighting is demonstrated by

the fact that for these attacks the Americans amassed
over 600 ships, about 2,000 planes, and over 500,000
men. 4
Occupation of the Marianas was a key element in
American strategy.

The capture of Guam and Saipan in

August of 1944 meant that for the first time in the war,
U.S. B-29 bomber planes based on these islands could
reach Japanese industrial centers.

It has been estimated

that these raids destroyed almost one-third of the entire
Japanese capital plant.

Guam, Saipan, and Tinian also

served as major supply bases for the Americans.

The

actions which ended the Pacific War, the dropping of
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were initiated in
Micronesia.

The Enola Gay, the American plane which

dropped the bombs, took off from an airfield on Tinian.^
As a result of their experience in Micronesia
during the war, the Navy and armed forces emerged with
perhaps an exaggerated sense of the strategic importance
of these islands.

Por example, it was widely contended

that too much "American blood and treasure" had been
expended ever to allow Micronesia to fall into enemy
hands again.^

(The attitudes of specific individuals
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within the military will he examined later in this
chapter).

By December of 1945, 179 officers and 862

enlisted men remained to occupy the former Mandated
Islands.8
While the intentions of United States policy
makers concerning the disposition of the Micronesian
islands specifically remained rather vague during the
war, the overall American position on the acquisition
of territory was stated repeatedljr in the form of
communiques issued jointly by the major allied powers.
For example, on August 14, 1941' the United States and
other Allies issued the Atlantic Charter in which they
pledged to "seek no aggrandizement, territorial or
Q
other."
This pledge was reiterated in the Cairo
Declaration of November 1943, when the Allies pledged
that they coveted "no gain for themselves, and have no
10
thought of territorial expansion."

The Declaration

included a proposal for stripping Japan of any and all
islands acquired after 1914 as well as any other terri
torial gains achieved by violence;

On December 1, 1943

the United States and the Allies issued the Cairo
Declaration which asserted that "the Three Great Allies
are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression
of Japan.

They covet no gain for themselves and have no

thought of territorial expansion."11

It was not until
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February of 1945 at Yalta that the Allies agreed on the
kinds of territories which might become trusteeships.
In general, it was agreed that territory taken from the
enemy as a result of the war as well as former mandates
of the League of Nations could become trusteeships, if
12
According to B^rrnes*

all those involved agreed.

memoirs, Churchill indicated, "if it is a question
solely of dealing with enemy territory acquired during the
war, it might be proper to put them into some form of
trusteeship under the United Nations."

1"5

As an example

of the type of territory suitable for this trusteeship
status, he referred to "the Japanese mandated islands."^
On July 20, 1945 President Truman asserted, "we are not
fighting for conquest.

There is not one inch of territory

nor one thing of monetary value that we want out of this
war."

This promise was reaffirmed on October 27, 1945

when the President again pledged, "we do not seek for
ourselves one inch of territory any place in the world.
These pronouncements may have reflected the
honest feelings of the Allies during the war, but they
had to be attuned to specific perceived American security
needs in Micronesia following the war, which requires a
consideration of the impact that American military
operations in the Pacific war, especially in the Micronesian
area, had on post-war strategic thinking and planning.
This impact can perhaps best be assessed by determining
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16
the position of important military and civilian officials
who were involved in the status dehate which occurred
following the war.
There was virtually universal acceptance within
the United States that legitimate American security
interests in Micronesia should he protected.

The

divergence of opinion occurred over the hest means to
accomplish this objective.

The defense establishment, in

cluding the Departments of War and Navy, as well as some
members of Congress, favored outright annexation— i.e.
they contended that only unilateral security measures
would assure the country's safety.
expressed

The civilian attitude,

the Departments of State and Interior,

favored an international trusteeship which would be
administered multilaterally along the lines espoused by
the then late Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The United Nations

Charter provided a compromise solution which was finally
accepted in 1947, ''strategic'1 trusteeship status which
will be considered in detail below.

Until late in 1946,

then, the issue was debated heatedly.
The Secretaries of State, War, Navy and the
Interior were instructed by President Truman in 1945 to
assess Micronesia's future political status.^

This

committee maintained an existence separate from the
already established State-War-Navy Co-ordinating
Committee which was charged with U.S. political and
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military policies in occupied areas.

17

The "strategic

trusteeship" proposal finally submitted to the Security
Council in November of 194-6 was produced by the Co
ordinating Committee.^8
The Navy and its Congressional supporters shrank
from the prospect of a trusteeship for Micronesia, partly
due to a false impression that such a status would give
the United Nations, rather than the United States,
1Q
ultimate control over the area. 17 late in the summer
of 1945» in testimony before the House Naval Affairs
Committee, Admiral Ernest J. King stated the military’s
demand for effective unilateral American control over
Micronesia in the post-war period:
Obviously, sovereignty is to be preferred; but
as far as the Navy is concerned, whatever diplomatic
arrangements will promote co-operation among the
nations of the world and will insure our having
control of the essential bases in the name of the
United States, will suffice for us. They can call
it a trusteeship or anything they like.20
In a report of August 1945 a Subcommittee on
Pacific Bases of the House Committee on Naval Affairs
recommended that the U.S. should retain at least domin
ating control over the former Japanese mandated islands—
in the interest of the security of the United States as
well as the entire Western Hemisphere.

21

The attitude of the military establishment was
further articulated on September 5, 1945 (less than one
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month after the close of the Pacific War) in a public
statement made by Assistant Secretary of the Wavy,
H.

Struve Hensel, which indicated what the military

on-

sidered the "absolute minimum" number of bases necessary
in the Pacific.

He included only "those we should intend

to maintain and which are susceptible to defense."

The

list, which named such vital strategic areas as Hawaii
and the Philippines, included the Guam-Saipan-Tinian area
(regarded as one base.)^
The military’s attitude persisted until the
strategic trust was agreed upon.

In a high-level meeting

on October 22, 1946 called by President Truman with top
members of the State, Navy and War Departments present,
Admiral Nimitz, Chief of Naval Operations, gave his
opinion on Micronesia’s strategic value.

The gist of his

statement, recorded in the diary of Secretarjr of the Navy,
Porrestal, was that continued American control over
Micronesia was"essential to U.S. securit^r in the Pacific.
According to Porrestal, Nimitz’ "considered opinion" was
. . . that the sovereignty of the ex-Japanese
mandates should be taken by the U.S., . . . that the
ultimate security of the U.S. depends in major part
on our ability to control the Pacific Ocean, and that
these islands are part of the complex essential to
that control, and that the concept of trusteeship is
inapplicable here because these islands do not
represent any colonial problem nor is there economic
advantage accruing to the U.S. through their owner
ship . . . .23
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Porrestal himself, fearing that the islands would he
given away, spoke for the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he
said "we must maintain strong Pacific hases . . . per
mitting full exploitation of mobilitjr of forces which
was such a vital factor in victory in the Pacific."

24

It is true that some members of the civilian
establishment reflected a view not totally opposed to
the military's position.

Por example, Prancis B. Sayre-

Woodrow Wilson’s grandson and the U.S. representative
to the United Nations Trusteeship Council writing in 194-8,
indicated:
. . . the strong desire that these non-selfgoverning territories should play their part in the
maintenance of international peace and security.
The lesson of the Second World War bit into our souls.
After the war we were determined that never again
should Pacific islands be a.llowed to serve as bases
for aggression by militaristic nations. In so far
as they possessed potential value as military or
naval bases, they must be utilized for the common
defense of the United Nations fighting for human
rights and never for the aggressive designs of any
single state acting in its own interests.25
Further explaining his view of Micronesia’s military
potential, Sayre continued, "thejr (the Micronesian islands)
are of tremendous strategic value . . .

It was their

interlocking network of naval and air bases that in the
late war nrevented sending early and effective support
to China except b3r circuitous and highly difficult routes."2^
However, the dominant civilian attitude was
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represented most adamantly by Secretary of the Interior,
Harold 1. Ickes.

It was at his insistence that on

October 20, 1945, President Truman established the State¥ay-Havy-Interior Committee to study the situation and
present policy recommendations for resolving the status
Question.

It is interesting to note however that the

Department of

the Interior wasexcluded from most of

the

formal and informal discussion and investigation, under
taken by the Committee— leaving the State Department
p7

outgunned

_

„

and outnaneuvered• 1 incidentally, ickes

vigorously opposed the ’’strategic trusteeship”

alternative,

arguing that it represented only a technical concession
by the annexationists which, deviated little from out
right American sovereignty over the area.2j

The anti-

annexationists outside the government worked through the
Institute of Ethnic Affairs headed by John Collier, the
publisher of Collier’s Weekly.2^
The State Department’s position was that America’s
international obligations dictated a trusteeship solution.
They hoped to honor the pledge of the Atlantic Charter
opposing annexation.

As a supporter of the United nations,

the U.S. was necessarily obliged to support its offspring,
the trusteeship system,

finally, the State Department

maintained that the islands should fall under internal ioiml
supervision since they were made mandates under the
meagre of nations.^
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The difference between ITimitz and Porrestal on
the one hand, and the Interior and State Departments on
the other reflected the battle which raged within the
U.S. government for many months after the war.

The military

demanded outright annexation to assure maximum protection
of U.S. security, while most civilians favored an inter
national trusteeship of the type envisioned by the thenlate Pranhlin D. Roosevelt.

President Truman attempted

to arbitrate among these conflicting interests within
his administration by remaining as flexible as possible.
As late as January 15, 194-6, in an noff-the-recordn

press

conference, he indicated that those areas in Micronesia
which were considered absolutely vital by the military
would be retained under a unilateral trusteeship arrange
ment, while the remainder would fall under the jurisdiction
of a multilateral trusteeship administered presumable?1 by
51

all nations involved In Pacific security.

it was not

until Hovember of 194-6 that the State-War-Navy Co-ordinating
Committee reached agreement on the Hstrategic trust”
status referred to e a r l i e r . O n Hovember 6 (194-6),
Truman stated that "the United States is now prepared to
place under trusteeship, with the United States as the
administering authority, the Japanese mandated
islands . . .
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H O W TH E U.S.

GOT THE U.N. TO A C C E P T STRATEGIC
STATUS P O R M I C R O N E S I A

Once debate bad been resolved within the United
States Government, the remaining problem was to secure
acceptance of this solution by the United Nations.

By

the time the trusteeship agreement for Micronesia was
being discussed (summer of 1947), the Cold War had
already begun— so that the primary obstacle to acceptance
of the document was Soviet intransigence.

How the Soviets

were induced not to block the agreement is a matter of
some dispute.

John. Foster Dulles, then the U.S. repre

sentative to the Trusteeship

Council,

has indicatedin

his memoirs that the

Soviets tried to

extract various

concessions from the

U.S. in exchange

for their co

operation, e.g. U.S.

support for Russian designs on a

colonial base in the Mediterranean.

Dulles writes that

he and Byrnes flatly rejected all such suggestions.^
Thus, Dulles was very much surprised when the agreement
was approved by the Security Council on April 2, 1947,
without any Soviet objections.

Apparently, according

to Dulles, the Soviets feared outright American annexation
of the islands if the Russian veto was exercised in the
Security Council.

He reasoned as follows:

Somewhat to our surprise, the Soviet Union did
not exercise its veto power to block the agreement.
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It presumably realised that if this trusteeship
agreement -•/ere blocked by a Soviet veto, the
result would he outright annexation of the islands
by the United States. Also, the Soviet Union had
never shown a great interest in the Japanese mandated
islands except as a basis for bargaining. It had
much more concern with ITorth African trusteeships,
and with a possible trusteeship of Okinawa in the
event that the United States should ’assume respon
sibility’ for it . . .
The view expressed by Dulles was formed in large part,
110 doubt, by his relations with the Soviet represent

ative, ¥.1. Molotov.
Byrnes explained these events in a somewhat
different maimer, referring to his negotiations with
Molotov, even before the first session of the Trusteeship
Council.

The two were debating a provision in the Charter

which indicates that each trusteeship agreement must be
approved by the "states directly concerned.” Gromyko
insisted that the USSR was a state directly' concerned with
the *■icronesian trusteeship.

lie indicated that there

would probably be no Soviet opposition, if it was agreed
formally that all five permanent members of the Security
Council were "states directly concerned" with each
trusteeship agreement.

He explained that a formal ex

change of letters to this effect would facilitate
organization of the Trusteeship Council.

In his reply,

Byrnes linked Soviet cooperation regarding the Micronesian
trusteeship to U.S. agreement to Russian control over
the southern half of Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands:
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Such a definition of ’states directly concerned’,
I replied, was a matter of charter interpretation
within the United Nations itself, and should not
he the subject of a bilateral arrangement between our
two governments. I then added that I would bear his
(Molotov’s) position in mind when considering the
ultimate disposition of the Kurile Islands and the
southern half of Sakhalin. This brought a very quick
response. The Soviet Union, he said, did not contem
plate a trusteeship arrangement for the Kuriles or
Sakhalin; these matters had been settled at Yalta. I
pointed out to him that Mr. Roosevelt had said
repeatedly at Yalta, that territorjr could be ceded
only at the peace conference and he had agreed only
to support the Soviet Union’s claim at the conference.
While it could be assumed that we would stand by
Mr. Roosevelt’s promise, I continued, we certainly
would want to know, by the time of the peace conference,
what the Soviet Union’s attitude toward our proposal
for nlacing the Japanese mandated islands under our
trusteeship. Mr. Molotov quickljr grasped the impli
cations of this remark. When the United States
trusteeship agreement was voted upon later by the
Security Council, I was delighted, but not surprised,
to see that the Soviet representative voted in favor
of our proposal.*
The trusteeship agreement, which had been sub
mitted to the Trusteeship Council on February 27, 1947,
was approved on April 2.

Article 1 of the Trusteeship

Agreement designated the territory as a "strategic” area.
Under the authority of this provision the United States
could shift policy debates to a more manageable environment
by removing the discussions from the Trusteeship Council,
where the U.S. has only one vote, to the Security Council,
where it has a veto.

Article 13 of the Trusteeship

Agreement is also relevant to an analysis of American
security interests.

It states that:
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The provisions of Articles 87 and 88 of the
(United Nations) Charter shall he applicable to the
trust territory, provided that the administering_
authority may determine the extent of their appli
cability to any areas which may from time to time
be specified by it as closed for security reasons.5 '
T he p r o v i s i o n s r e f e r r e d to, A r t i c l e s
the U n i t e d N a t i o n s Charter,

87 a n d 88 of

d e s c r i b e the f u n c t i o n s and

p o w e r s of the T r u s t e e s h i p Council.

Article

87 p r o v i d e s

that:

The General Assembly and, under its authority,
the Trusteeship Council, in carrying out their
functions, may:
a. consider reports submitted by the adminis
tering authority;
b. accept petitions and examine them in consul
tation with the”administering authority;
c. provide for periodic visits to the respective
trust territories at times agreed upon with the
administering authority; and
d. take these and other actions in conformity
with the terms of the trusteeship agreements.58
Article 88 further directs that:
The Trusteeship Council shall formulate a
questionnaire on the political, economic, social, and
educational advancement of the inhabitants of each
trust territory, and the administering authority for
each trust territory within the competence of the
General Assembly shall make an annual report to the
General Assembly upon the basis of such questionnaire.5°
It would appear that Article 13 of the Trusteeship
Agreement allows the United States considerable freedom
of action in military and security matters.

Specific

instances when this freedom has been asserted will be

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

26

noted "below.
Article 5 of the Trusteeship Agreement defines
more specifically the rights that the U.S. government
enjoyed in Micronesia.
In discharging its obligations under Article 76(a)
and Article 84 of the Charter, the administering
authority shall ensure that the trust territory shall
pla37 its part in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, in the maintenance of international
peace and security. To this end the administering
authority shall "be entitled:
1 . to establish naval, military and air bases
and to erect fortifications in the trust territory;
2 . to station and employ armed forces in the
territory; and
3 . to make use of volunteer forces, facilities
and assistance from the trust territory in carrying
out the obligations towards the Security Council
undertaken in this regard by the administering
authority, as well as for the local defense and the
maintenance of law and order within the trust
territory.
Perhaps another question remains to be considered,
that is the broader issue of the American commitmant to
various alternative future political statuses for
Micronesia.

When the United Nations Charter was being

debated, the United States was the only major power which
insisted on including the option of designating a trust
territory as a "strategic'1 area, in addition to the pro
visions of Article 3 noted above.

Given the security

fixation of the United States, the question remained:
would the United States ever agree to the maximum goal
of Article 76(b) of the Charter:
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. . . to promote the political, economic, social,
and educational advancement of the inhabitants of
the trust territories, and their progressive develop
ments towards self-government or independence as
may be appropriate to the particular circumstances
of each territory and its peoples and the freely
expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as
may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship
agreement . . . A 1
S U MMARY

A brief summary of the background and environment
of the U.S. presence in Micronesia may be useful before
moving to the detailed analysis of American policy between
1945 and 1972 provided in Chapter 3.

The Second World

War created a climate of opinion in the American foreign
policy community which virtually dictated some continued
U.S. presence in the postwar period.

Opinions diverged

on the degree of international involvement to be allowed
in administering the area.

What has been characterized

here as the preponderant civilian opinion was to place
Micronesia under some kind of multilateral international
control to be administered through the United Rations.
The military, on the other hand, insisted that legitimate
American security interests could be adequately protected
only if the area were placed directly under U.S. control,
perhaps in the form of an unincorporated territory or some
similar arrangement.

The compromise which was struck was

the "strategic” trusteeship which combined elements of
both positions.

However, given the nature of this

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

"strategic” arrangement, as described earlier in this
chapter, the international character of the trusteeship
appears to have been overshadowed by the provisions
which protect American security interests.
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Chapter 3

ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES OF U.S. POLICY
IN THE TRUST TERRITORY
The focus of this chapter will he an examination
ox United States policy in Micronesia with specific
reference to progress in the areas of political, economic,
social, and educational advancement and how these develop
ments promoted independence or self-government.
When it signed the treaty accepting membership
in the United Nations, the United States committed
itself to the goal of the Trusteeship System (as did the
powers which administered the other trusteeships) as
established in Chapter XII, Article 76(h) of the U.N.
Charter, namely "to promote the political, economic,
social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants
of the Trust Territory and their progressive development
toward self-government or independence."”' At the very
least the success or failure of American policy can be
measured by the standards which the United States imposed
on itself in the Trusteeship Agreement (Article 6) when
it accepted the obligation "to promote the political,
economic, social, and educational advancement of the
9
inhabitants of the t errito r y . W i t h this explanation
in mind, specific sections of the Trusteeship Agreement
32
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dealing with each area of development will he the criteria
used to evaluate U.S. policy.
While it is bejrond the scope of this study (and
in fact this area could possibly he the subject of a
separate research undertaking), some reference to the
Japanese effort in Micronesia under the league of Nations
International Mandates system may provide an added
dimension to the analysis of U.S. policy during the
trusteeship period.

As noted in Chapter 1, Japanese

administration began formally in 1920 with the initiation
of the League of Nations mandates system.

Much of the

population of the islands was composed of Japanese who
had emigrated to the area— of a total population of
64,819 in 1930, 21,422 were Japanese.^

By way of

comparison, in 1972 only 1,077 American civilians were
working in Micronesia.^
The Japanese succeeded in building an elementary
infrastructure for the Micronesian economy that, according
to some observers, the Americans have failed to maintain.
Many of these facilities which survived World War II
were allowed to fall into disuse.

Bor example, on the

island of Dublon in the Truk Islands District, an
exemplary water system has rusted away,^ and fleets of
fishing vessels were scattered throughout the islands.

7

The Japanese also constructed ports, hospitals, and paved
roads.

Many of these roads paved by the Japanese have
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■been swallowed up by the jungle as was, for exa.mple, the
road on Babelthuap that had been used to transport the
goods of copra farmers and fishermen to market.^

Many

useful facilities and activities which were destroyed or
disrupted by the war were never rebuilt or restored.
On Saipan, in the town of Garapan, the Japanese had set
up a series of sugar mills that were wiped out in heavy
ground fighting.^

Koror, a resort city for the Japanese,

a vacation spot for visitors from the home islands,
complete with geisha houses, excellent restaurants, and
Shinto shrines, was the capital of the mandate and the
site of fish canneries and a pineapple industry.

The

tow. was demolished during the war and has never been
rebuilt fully.
Under Japanese direction, the islands’ primary
exports were pearls, phosphate, sugar cane,^ fish, and
pineapples.

Under the American administration, of these

products, only fish is being exported.

In 1972, the

primar^r exports were copra, fish, and handicrafts.

12

A

quantitative comparison is provided in Table 2 which
indicates the level of Micronesian imports and exports
under both Japanese and American administration.

Under

the Japanese a trade surplus was created, with exports
consistently exceeding imports.

The reverse has been

true under the United States since 1951.

A more detailed

analysis of the American record, will be provided later
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Comparison of the Level of Micronesian Imports and.
under Japanese and American Administration

J apan*
Exports
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936

$12,399,225.57
16,066,316.24
17,742,638.54
23,915,008.27
22,912,332.17

United States_
Exports
Imports

Imports
$ 5,877,621.79
7,725,836.68
12,489,224.94
13,802,113.86
17,307,223.47

1948
1950
1952
1954
1956
1958
I960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972

$

894,,509
1,,644,,181
1,,750,,162
3.,342,,789
1,,605,,446
2i,236,,68?
1.,722,,336
1.,765,,343
2!
,644,,105
,008,,159
3:
3.,025,,571
4 ,,176,,003
2 ;,636,,735

$

731,,870
1.,347,,901
1.,848,,885
2 ;,258,,326
2 ,763,,091
3 ,,451,,783
3 ,,030,,745
3 ,140,,762
•
,585
5 ■,685 '
8,,916,,61?
13.,572,,052
20,,920,,318
26,,334,,062

__
Soxirces: United States, Department of the i n t e r i o rAnnual
Reports to the Secretary
of the I n terior, for each respective year— -1950, p. 147; 195”
2 0 ; 1956, p ."12;
195’S, p._ 14; I960, p. 24; 1961, p. 51; 1962, p. 28; 1967
1968 _
16; United
States, Department of the Navy, Information on the Trust L'erritory of the Pacific
Islands transmitted by the United States to the Secretary General of the United
nations "(1947-48) (v/ashington, D . C . : Government Printing Office, 194877 p. 88;
United States, Department of State, Annual Reports to the United Nations on the
Administration of the Trust Territory
■™'he“'Fac~Ti c i sTand^
or each respective
fiscal year- =1971,“ p 270; 1972, p. 27lJ and Tradao Yanaihara, Pacific Islands Under
Japanese Mandate ___
A Report in the International Research Series^ox^^tTTe institute of
the Institute of Paci ric Relations (London and New York:
Oxford University "Press'
1940*), p. 51.
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in this chapter.
However, the conclusion to he drawn from this
compa.rison is not entirely clear,

hid economic activity

thrive under the Japanese or was the area being exploited
economically by a colonial power?

The economic success

of the Japanese effort may he coupled with the fact that
over one-third of the islands’ population was Japanese.
With virtually all the exports being sent to Japan,
perhaps the least that can he concluded was that
Micronesia’s economic growth which vras promoted by the
Japanese also aided the Japanese economic situation.
It should he pointed out that following World
War II, the United States summarily collected the 122,482
Japanese still in the islands and deported them to Japan.^
Besides eliminating the Japanese military presence,
these deportations had the effect of removing the most
able and active elements in Micronesia’s economic system.
Although it is difficult to determine precisely/ what the
Micronesian attitude is toward the Japanese, one islander
working under the American government observed that ’’the
Japanese wrere horrible people but they did so much;
Americans are wonderful people but they do so little.”1^
Unfortunately for comparative purposes, the kinds
of basic auanitative and qualitative data which are
available from the United Nations regarding the American
experience are simply not available from League of Nations

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

37

records.

Annual reports from the mandatory powers were

published in only one year, 1924.

Statistics for other

years were compiled for some of the mandates.

However,

annual reports were required only from those powers
administering Class A mandates.

Since Micronesia was a

Class C mandate, Japan was under no compulsion to file
any reports with the league Secretariat.

Japan’s secrecy

regarding her Pacific possessions before World War II
is well known.

So is her increasing disenchantment with

the league which was climaxed by her withdrawal in 1938.
Por these reasons Japan was not inclined to provide
detailed data regarding economic development in Micronesia,
especially after the first few years of administration.
Por this reason a more detailed comparison of Japanese
and American administration of Micronesia will not be
attempted here.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
As explained above, Article 6, Section 1 of the
Trusteeship Agreement provides a yardstick for gauging
American police’- in the field of political development.
It charges that the United States shall:
. . . foster the development of such political
institutions as are suited to the Trust Territory and
shall promote the development of the Trust Territory
toward self-government or independence as may be
appropriate to the particular circumstances of the
Trust Territory and the freely expressed wishes of
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■the people concerned; and to this end shall give to
the inhabitants of the Crust Territory a progressively
increasing share in the administrative services in
the territory; shall develop their participation in
government; shall give due recognition to the customs
of the inhabitants in providing a system of lav/ for
the territory; and shall talce other.,appropriate
measures towards these ends . . .

Before proceeding to an analysis of the various
indicators of political development, a thiinbnail shetch.
of the policy of each of the five American presidents
who have administered Micronesia may prove useful.
Under Harry S. Truman the trusteeship idea that
had been envisioned by earlier American presidents was
modified and implemented.

As a mors detailed examination

in Chapter 5 will show, military factors were probably
the overriding considerations involved in the formation
of the trusteeship.

One compelling indication of this

emphasis on security was the designation of the navy,
a military agency, to rule the area as a "strategic"
trust territory.
Dwight D. Eisenhower *s terms as president saw
a partial conversion to civilian administration (under
the Department of the Interior), with Saipan and Tinian
remaining under military control.

It may be appropriate

to characterize this period as being motivated by a
"caretaker" philosophy; i.e. the American Congress
appropriated barely enough money to cover administrative
costs and only a very limited and select number of

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

39

development projects.

It should be pointed out, however,

that a precursor to the Congress of Micronesia was b o m
during the Eisenhower years.
When John P. Kennedy became President, he appointed
a commission to analyze U.S. policy in Micronesia to make
policy recommendations for its improvement.

On the basis

of the "Solomon Report", as the report of the Commission
came to be known, a policjr reassessment occurred in 1962
which resulted in the initiation of sweeping changes in
all fields.

These trends will be noted in each section

of this chapter.

Symptomatic of the change was Kennedy's

request to Congress, which was honored, to increase the
appropriations for the territory."*^

Some observers have

associated the policy change in Micronesia with the increase of American involvement in Viet Uam.

17

Several developments occurred during Lyndon B.
Johnson's presidency.

Both the authorized ceiling and

the actual level of appropriations continued to rise.

In

1965 the first territory-wide legislative body, the
Congress of Micronesia, was established."*8 President
Johnson proposed the establishment of an American
commission to study the alternative future political
statuses open to the Micronesians with a view to conducting
a plebiscite in the territory by June of 1972.

The

measure was passed by the Senate on May 29, 1968, but it
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died in committee in the House of Representatives.

19

During the administration of President Richard
M. Mixon, the Micronesian people have become more and
more politically conscious.

Through their legislative

body, the Congress of Micronesia, and its agent, the
Joint Status Commission, they are demanding a resolution
of their political future.

In response to these demands,

President Mixon established an Office for Status
Negotiations headed by Ambassador Arthur Hummel.

A

series of negotiations occurred between the American and
the Micronesian representatives.

The outcome of these

negotiations is not entirely certain, and they will be
the focus of analysis later.
Legislative Branch of G-overnment
Has the legislative branch of government in the
Trust Territory been an instrument of political develop
ment?

Has United States policy been successful in

promoting the "self-government or independence" prescribed
b}/' the United Nations Charter?

These questions provide

the focus for analysis of the indigenous legislature in
Micronesia.
Area-wide political consciousness has developed
very slowly in Micronesia, due in large part to the
separation of the 2,000-odd islands by vast expanses
of ocean.

Although it is relatively small in terms of
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actual land area, the trust territorjr covers an expanse
of ocean nearly as large a.s the continental United
States.

The resulting isolation is intensified "by poor

transportation

90

coupled with parochialism which makes

inhabitants of one groirp of islands, atoll, or even a
single island, look on all other Micronesians as foreigners.
The existence of nine major languages in the territory
testifies to a history of inter-island isolation.

21

The primary vehicle for the development of any
"territorial consciousness" among the islanders has been
the Congress of Micronesia, the body currently responsible
for political status negotiations with the U.S.

It is

composed of a Senate and a House of Representatives.

Two

Senators are elected on an at-large basis from each of
the six districts.

The twelve members of the Senate

serve four-year terms.

Representation in the House of

Representatives is based on population.

The current

apportionment of the twenty-one Representatives is as
follows:

Mariana Islands District, 3; Marshall Islands

District, 4: Palau District, 3; Ponape District, 4;
Truk District, 5; and Yap District, 2.

22

Representatives

are elected for two year terms from single-member election
districts that are approximately equal in population.
Congressional elections are held biennially in evennumoered years.

23
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Although the Congress of Micronesia was not formed
until 1965, its roots grew from a beginning in August of
1956 when the Inter-District Advisory Commission was
created.2^' The IDAC developed slowlj* with the creation
of three committees in as many years:

a social committee

in 1 9 5 9 , an economic committee in I960,2'
0 and a political
committee in 1961.

27

These groups parallel three of the

four policy areas which the U.S. was pledged to promote.
Significantly, 1961 was the first year in which the IDAC
members were elected by the public.2o

This was early in

the Kennedy Administration, a period that saw the imple
mentation of policy changes set in motion by the recommen
dations of the Solomon Report.

Although the report was

not submitted to the President until October of 1963,
this development in the legislative sphere suggests that
Kennedy was considering the change even before the report
reached his desk.

Public election of IDAC members is

not in itself indicative of a policy change, but it does
represent political development toward the U.iT. goal of
independence or self-government.
name to the Council of Micronesia,

The IDAC changed its
pc
ond, In a special

session during March, of 1363, it recommended to tne nigh
Commissioner the structure of a proposed territorial
legislature.^0
The Future Political Status Commission was created
by the Congress of Micronesia during its Tnird Regular
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Session in August of 1967.

31

The Commission, chaired by

Senator Lazarus E. Salii of Palau, held its first meeting
on Saipan in November of 1967.

Since then it has repre

sented Micronesian aspirations for a resolution of the
political status dilemma in six rounds of status negotia.tions with American officials.

The Commission, as reflected

in its composition (4 Representatives and 8 Senators),
is a joint endeavor of both houses of the Micronesian
legislature.

Indeed, the Commission has, during the course

of the status negotiations, changed its title to the
"Joint Committee on Future Status" to reflect this fact.
The Committee has acted under broad powers delegated by
the Congress.

The act creating the Status Delegation

authorized it to "actively seek, support, and press for
an earl:/ resolution and determination of the future
32

political status of Micronesia."

An evaluation of U.S. policy in the legislative
sphere would be incomplete without noting the rather
severe restrictions under which the Congress of Micronesia
operates.

The powers of the Congress extend "to all

3.ppropriate subjects of legislation."

33

What constitutes

an "appropriate subject" is defined by the United States
according to the order of the Secretary of the Interior
which created the Congress,

limitations on the powers of

the indigenous legislature are quite specific.
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. . . Ho legislation may "be inconsistent with
treaties or international agreements of the United
States; laws of the United States applicable to the
Territory, Executive orders of the President of the
United States and orders of the Secretary of the
Interior, or Sections 1 through 12 (Bill of Rights) of
the Trust Territory Code. Further, the Congress
may not impose any tax on property of the United
States or of the Territory, nor may it tax the proid ents at a higher rate than that

Furthermore, the appropriation power of the Congress is
restricted to funds raised by the territory through local
taxes, including export and import duties, and does not
extend to funds granted bir the American Congress.

These

funds are under the direct and exclusive control of the
High Commissioner, the chief executive of the Territorial
Government who has always been an American appointed by
the President.

Besides having this monetary restriction,

the High Commissioner is empowered to veto any and all
35
actions of the Micronesian legislature. '

It is true,

however, that his use of the veto has been somewhat
restrained.

Within these rigidly enforced boundaries,

the Micronesian legislature has remained relatively
autonomous.
In terms of political development, the evidence
suggests that the Congress of Micronesia has become the
primary vehicle for the expression of indigenous desires
for a change in the territory’s political status.

Growing

slowly from its beginnings as an advisory body in 1956,
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the Congress was formally established as a legislative
■body in 1965.

It does operate under some confining

restrictions, especially its limited budgetary powers
and the High Commissioner’s broad veto powers.

However,

by creating and directing the Future Political Status
Commission, the Congress has fulfilled its potential, at
least to a degree, for promoting political development
and for defining the territory’s future political status.
Since the United States established the initial advisor;/
body in 1956 and promoted its development into a fullfledged legislative body, it must be concluded that in
the legislative branch of government, American policy has,
on the whole, successfully promoted political development.
Executive Branch of C-overnment
Has the United States promoted political develop
ment and self-government or independence through its
actions regarding the executive branch of government?
Has the directive of Article 6 , Section 1 of the Trustee
ship Agreement to give the Micronssians na progressively
increasing share in the administrative services in the
territory" been fulfilled?
American policy has been to replace nonindigenous
employees in the executive branch with indigenes as
rapidly as possible.^

In the years before 1962 the

number of Microns sians so emploj'ed ranged between 1,500
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and 1,900.^

Although the number of Americans working

for the Trust Territory Government has increased,
Micronesian employment has increased at a greater rate.
By 1972 indigenes accounted for just under 90 per cent
of total government employment in the territory.
Given the fact that Micronesians occupy most
government positions, is their participation uniform
throughout all levels of the administration?

The District

Administrators, who are the chief executive officers in
each of the territory’s six districts, are Micronesians
who have been appointed by the High Commissioner.

However,

the evidence suggests that at the territorial level
policy-making in the executive branch is still controlled
largely by Americans.

Figure 2 depicts the organization

of the High Commissioner’s Office.

According to American

reports to the United Uations, this group of individuals
functions collectively as a de facto cabinet, advising the
39
High Commissioner on ’’matters of policy and program.”
For the most part, the highest officials in each depart
ment or office are Americans, while the directors of
various divisions within a department are quite often
Micronesians.

For example, the Department of Public

Affairs is headed by an American, H. Ueiman Craley, while
Micronesians hold positions as Deputy Director and
administrators in charge of community development, legis
lative liaison, and civic affairs.

This suggests that
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while Micronesians are occupying some positions of respon
sibility and are receiving invaluable and necessary
experience, top level policy decisions in the executive
branch are still largely influenced by Americans.
As noted above, the High Commissioner himself has
always been an American who is appointed by the President
of the United States with the concurrence of the Senate.
She first three High Commissioners were admirals in the
Navy,10 a further indication of the military value
attached to the islands after World War II.

On January 8,

1951, Mr. Elbert D. Thomas became the territory’s first
civilian High Commissioner.11

Since then, five other

individuals have filled that position.

Hone have been

career civil servants or have had any particular expertise
in island administration.

For example, William R. Norwood,

a newspaper executive, was appointed in 1966, and according
to some observers he was "respected by most Micronesians."10
Currently the position is held by a Nixon appointee,
Mr. Edward S. Johnston, formerly an insurance executive
and a high ranking member of the Republican Party in Hawaii.
The chief executive officer in other territories of the
United States (which admittedly have different relation
ships with the United States) are natives.

For example,

in American Samoa he is a native appointed by the President,
while in Guam he is popularly elected.1''
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The position of the High Commissioner vis-a-vis
the Congress of Micronesia is a strong one in light of
the fact that he has been given a function usually con
sidered to be legislative in nature.

As noted above, he,

not the indigenous legislature, controls the annual
appropriation from the U.S. Congress— a sum which Table 3
indicates usually constitutes about 70 per cent of the
Territory's total operating funds, although that figure
had climbed to 95 per cent in 1971.

In other words, the

native lawmakers control at most only 30 per cent of the
funds spent by the Trust Territo^ Government annually.
It is true that appropriations from the American Congress
have risen dramatically, especially in the years since
1962, but the evidence suggests that this situation has
materially increased the powers of the High Commissioner—
not those of the Congress of Micronesia.
However, a detailed analysis of the historjr of
U.S. appropriations for Micronesia may provide some indi
cation of the strength of the American commitment to
development in the territory.

During the period between

July 1, 1951 and June 30, I960, the U.S. allocation for
administration and capital improvements in Micronesia
totalled $165 million.

Between 1952 and 1962 annual

appropriations ranged from a low of 94,27lyOOO to a high
of $6,304,000.

The upper limit on appropriations during

this period, as established by Congress in 1954, was
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Table 3

United States Allocations as a Percentage
of the Total Micronesian Budget

Piscal Year

1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

United States
Appropriation

Total Bunds
Available

$15,000,000
17,500,000
17,344,000
19,201,000
30,200,000
30,000,000
48,112,000
59,864,000
59,980,000

122.087,769
23',507,736
23,755,638
26,4-36,205
37,997,947
41,252,410
52,894,456
62,916,094
73,569,885

Percentage

67.91
74.44
73.01
72.64
79.48
72.72
90.96
95.15
81.51

Sources; United States, Department of State, Annual
U'epori's to the United Nations on the Administration of
the Trust Territory oiTTKe Tacific'"T'sTands,' for each
respective fiscal year— 1968, p. 206; 1971, "D. 264-;
1972, p. 265.
$7,500,000.

As indicated in Table 4, the authorized

ceiling doubled in 1963 and increased consistently
throLighout the remainder of the 1960s and the early 1970s.
In 1970, 1971, and 1972 the amount actually appropriated
came very close to the authorized ceiling.

The American

commitment to Micronesia, as indicated by annual appro
priations, remained relatively constant until 1962.

But

in that year, a dramatic jump in the level of appropriations
signalled a change in the American attitude which has
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Table 4

Comparison of Authorised Ceiling for
United States Appropriations
and Actual Appropriations

fiscal Year
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960

1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967

1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
. .
. .
. .
. .
. .
. .
. .
. .
. .
. .
. .
. .

.
.
.
.
.

Budget Ceiling
. $ 7,500,000 . . .
.
7,500,000 . . .
.
7,500,000 . . .
.
7 ,500,000 . . .
.
7,500,000 , . .
.
7,500,000 . . .
.
7,500,000 . . .
. 15,000,000 . . .
. 1 7 ,500,000 . . .
. 1 7 ,500,000 . . .
. 17,500,000 . . .
. 2 5 ,000,000 . . .
. 35,000,000 . . .
. 3 5 ,000,000 . . .
. 5 0 ,000,000 . . .
. 60,000,000 . . .
. 60.000,000 . . .

Actual Appropriations*
. . .8 5 ,000,000
. . .

6 ,150,000

. . . 30,000,000
, . . 48,112,000

* includes appropriations and direct grants by the United
States Congress.
Sources:_ United States, Congress, Senate, 90th Congress,
faille day, .May 27) ,"*1968, "p. 8; Charles Leppert, 'J r . ,
Personal Letter, May 29, 19S9; United States, Department
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been reflected in the other po l i c y areas which have been
and will be discussed.

The reasons for this change will

be considered in greater detail in Chapter 4.
It may be constructive at this point to provide
a comparative perspective for American funding in
Micronesia by analyzing comparable statistics for other
political systems operating under similar conditions.
What levels of funding by other administering authorities
in other trust territories of the world promoted a degree
of development that made self-government or independence
possible?

The Trust Territory of Nauru and the Adminis

trative Union of Papua and New Guinea were both administered
by Australia under the United Nations Trusteeship System;
both are situated in the Western Pacific near Micronesia.
Since Nauru became independent 011 December 51, 1963, the
level of expenditures provided by its administering
authority might indicate what levels of appropriations
are needed before Micronesia can consider self-government
or independence.

In as ranch as the Administrative Union

of Papua and New Guinea has not achieved independence,
appropriations there may also be instructive.
Table 5 shows that U.S. per capita expenditures
in M i c r o n e s i a have consi s t e n t l y o utdistanced similar
A u s t r a l i a n expenditures in P a p u a and

New Guinea.

But the

A u s t r a l i a n effort in N a u r u u ntil its independence exceeded
U.S.

figures.

Since then,

however,

the A m e r i c a n per capita
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Table 5

Comp a r i s o n ox P e r C a pita A d m i n i s t r a t i o n Expenditures
in Micronesia,, P a p u a and N e w Guinea,
and Nauru, for Sel e c t e d Years

Piseal
Year
I960
1961
1962
1964
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

Micronesia

Papua and
New Guinea

$ 68.89
76.04
77.85
170.02
187.77
209.99
318.62
306.09
470.53
559.19
523.18

122.74
20.99
25.19
35.97
47.45

Nauru

*
1236,
-x335.
295.
*

*

-X-

•K-X-

#

*

•X-

-X-

*

* These data are not available.
Sources: Australia Yearbooks— No. 49 (1963), on. 159, 160;
No. 51 (1965), pp. 123, 124, 130, 137, 138; No*. 53 (1967),
pp. 62-66, 141, 143, 147, 149, 153, 155, 157; united States,
Department of the Interior, Annual Reports to the Secretary
of the Interior, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,
for ea,ch respective year— 1960, p. 66; 1961, p. 85; 1962,
p. 71; 1967,~p. 45; and United States, Department of
State, Annual Reports to the United Nations on the Adminis
tration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for
each respective year— 1963, p . THS’; 1968, p. 170;' 1971,
pp. 250, 214, 217; 1972, pp. 1, 265.
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expenditure has matched and surpassed this level.

The

o’ovious implication is that American policy has been
successful in terms of per capita expenditures whenmeasured against the last trust territory in the world
to achieve the U.U. goal of self-government or independence.
It should be noted that the parallel is by no means
precise, witness the large differences in the size of
the population.

Nevertheless, the trend is significant.

Micronesia's involvement in the budgetary process
is one indication of the territory's deep dependence on
the United States.

The trust territory's annual budget

is compiled by the Director of Budget and Finance.

He

proceeds by gathering recommendations and estimates from
a variety of administration officials, including the
High Commissioner’s "cabinet”.

After the High Commissioner

approves the estimates, the Director prepares a prelim;’nary
budget report.

The Congress of Micronesia does parti

cipate to a limited degree in considering those areas
of the budget which involve U.S. appropriations.

It may

make non-binding recommendations in these areas which it
presents to the High Commissioner.

Should the High

Commissioner refuse to incorporate these ideas into his
budget proposa.1, they are forwarded to the Secretary of
the Interior who has final authority/ in the matter.^
Proposed programs are reviewed by the Secretary’s Advisory
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Committee.

The Territory’s "budget is incorporated into

the Office of Management and Budget hearings and is
ultimately included in the President’s budget which is
approved annually by the American Congress.

45

The American record concerning progress and
political development in the executive branch of govern
ment appears to be mixed.

In terms of sheer numbers,

the U.S. goal of replacing nonindigenes with indigenes
seems to be moving toward success.

But when the level

of Micronesian participation is analyzed, it appears
that policy-making in the executive branch is still,
to a very great degree, controlled by Americans.

Although

the six District Administrators are Micronesians, the
High Commissioner and most of his ’’cabinet” continue to
be Americans.

The question of control of U.S. appro

priations illustrates the reluctance of American policy
makers to allow the Congress of Micronesia to act auton
omously, for the High Commissioner, not the indigenous
legislature, controls that segment of the territory’s
budget provided by the U.S. Congress.
The change in U.S. policy which occurred around
1962 is illustrated by the dramatic increases recorded
in the level of American appropriations for Micronesia.
The annual allocation doubled between 1962 and 1963,
rising steadil;y in subsequent years.

Even in comparative

terms, the American record has improved, as indicated
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in Table 5.
However, an analysis of budgetary considerations
does indicate the existence of a dilemma for U.S. policy
makers, a dilemma which may be unsolvable.

On the one

hand, should the United States fail to maintain and
increase funding, it can be charged with retarding, or
at least with not adequately promoting, development.

But,

on the other hand, when such funding has been made
available, it can be charged that this has made Micronesia
more and more dependent on the United States and has,
therefore, frustrated the goal of self-government or
independence.

The fact that over 70 per cent of the

territorial budget comes from the U.S. Congress illustrates
the problem.

It is unlikely that American lawmakers

would continue to provide this level of aid if Micronesia
chose to become independent.

It is further even more

unlikely that a new Micronesian government could function
adequately on a budget only one-third its previous size.
Thus, Micronesian dependence on U.S. financial support
may be influencing the direction of the area's future
political status.
Judicial Branch of Government
Article 6, Section 1 of the Trusteeship Agreement
stipulates that the role of the judicial branch of govern
ment in promoting political development shall be to
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"give due recognition to tiie customs of the inhabitants
in providing a system of law for the territory.

Basic

laws (civil, criminal, etc.) are a combination of the
Trust Territory Code, custom, and native laws.

In

attempting to abide by the appropriate provisions of
the Trusteeship Agreement, the United States has empowered
the Congress of Micronesia to alter the Code to meet
local circumstances.^

In terms of political development,

the indigenous legislature is participating in establishing
a legal framework and a system of jurisprudence that
will be adaptable to local conditions.
The degree of Micronesian participation in the
judicial branch is indicative of the extent of progress
toward the goal of self-government or independence.
There has been a conscious effort on the part of American
policy-makers to encourage Micronesian involvement in
the judicial branch below the highest level.

Indeed,

Section 183 of the Trust Territory Code directs that,
subject to retaining proper administration.

Micronesians

should be employed in the judicial system as much as
possible.^®

The court hierarchy consists of three tiers—

the High Court, district courts, and community courts.
The High Court is presided over by a Chief Justice,
two Associate Justices, and a panel of three temporary
judges— all Americans appointed by the U.S. Secretary
_
/Q
of the interior. r_' Micronesians are emploj'ed rather
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extensively at most of the lower levels, that is in
district and community courts.

However, it is interesting

to note that even at these levels, Micronesian partici
pation may he restricted, even eliminated, in areas the
U.S. considers strategical3_v important.

For example,

all the community courts are staffed b;g Micronesian
.judges except at the Ewajalein Test Site
American presides.

50

, where an

In general, though, Micronesian

participation is extensive at the lower levels, but the
apex of the judicial s^rstem is controlled by Americans.
District Government
Micronesian participation in government at the
district level is both broad and far-reaching.

As noted

above, the district administrators, the local chief
executives, of all six districts are Micronesians
appointed by and responsible to the High Commissioner.
It is interesting, however, that it is only within the
last decade that indigenes have occupied these levels.
District legislatures also provide for exclusively
Micronesian participation.

But no provision for indigenous

involvement in policy making at the district levelexisted until 1955— the year in which uhe Palau Congress,
the Territory's first district legislature, was chartered.
Gradual^,

51

over a period of eight years, a legislative

body was formed in each district.

52

The evidence suggests,
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then, that the United States has promoted extensive
Micronesian participation in "both the executive and
legislative tranches of district government.
However, like its territorial counterpart, the
district legislatures are subject to extensive restric
tion,

Although the district administrator’s veto may

he overridden by a two-thirds vote of the legislators,
the High Commissioner’s veto is final.

The territorial

analogy is also pertinent when the budgetary process is
considered.

The budget is prepared annually by the

district administrator and submitted to the legislature.
Although suggestions may come from individual legislators,
the series of appropriations bills designed to enact the
budget are usually based on the executive’s recommendation.
Either the district administrator or the High Commissioner
can veto any appropriation enacted bjr the local legis
lature.^

Just as at the territorial level, American

control over district legislation can be overriding.
An interesting trend becomes apparent when district
and local government revenues are examined.

Such revenues

have remained rather stable in recent years, and appear
limited in comparison to Territorial Government revenues
as Table 6 indicates.

These figures show that the revenues

available to district and municipal governments are limited.
However, an interesting relationship surfaces when the
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Table 6

Comparision of Total Municipal and District
Government Revenues with. Total
Trust Territory Revenues

Fiscal Year

196a
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

Total Municipal and
District Government
Revenues

Total Trust Territory
Government Revenu.es

S

980,085
891,593
969,600
954,872
1,065,083
1,455,103
1,827,288
2,515,680
2,658,274

$22,087,769
23,507,736
23,755,638
26,436,205
37,997,947
41,252,410
52,894,456
62,916,094
73,569',885

Sources: United States, Department of State, Annual
Reports to the United Rations on the Administration "of
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each
resoective fiscal year— 1968, un. 2blV"2'o"6; 1971,
PP. 259, 264; 1972, pp. 258, 265.
revenues which can be raised independently from outside
sources (that is, U.S. appropriations and grants) axe
compared; in other words, if U.S. funds were halted,
which might well occur should Micronesia choose indepen
dence as its future political status, the budgetary
situation would be entirely different.

Table 7 presents

the revenue ea-ch of the levels of government raises
through taxes, from sources independent from the United
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Table 7

Comparison of Revenue from Taxes
for Territorial, Municipal,
and District Governments

Fiscal
Year

1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

Territorial
Taxes

$

432,418
361,533
579,764
694,302
835,487
877,622
1,795,694

Municipal
Taxes

$184,193
177,137
185,713
240,612
406,616
401,548
521,002

District
Taxes

$

666,482
462,584
713,811
1,140,381
1,420,676
2,156,272
1,903,310

Total Municipal
and District
Taxes
$

850,675
639,721
899,524
1,380,993
1,827,292
2,557,820
2,424,312

Sources; United States, Department of State, Annual
Renorts to the United Rations on the Administration of
the' 'Trust Territory' of" "the Pacific Islands, for each
respective fiscal jrear— 1966, p . 279; 19’6'7, p. 228;
1968, p p . 205, 213; 1969, pp. 211, 219; 1970, p p . 237,
241, 242; 1971, p p . 261, 267: 1972, p p . 269, 270.
States.

Although municipal funds still remain below

territorial figures, district taxes yield well over onethird more revenue than territorial taxes.

When municipal

and district taxes are combin.ed, the total figure is over
twice the territorial sum.

This consideration may

influence deliberations by Micronesian leaders concerning
their future political status.

Should independence be

chosen, it is unlikely that the American Congress could
be persuaded to continue to provide appropriations and
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grants at t heir current levels,

if at all.

This appears

all the more significant in light of the p a r ochial
a t t i t u d e referred to ahove w h i c h still permeates the
islands,

at least to a degree.

Again,

should independence

he the option selected, w o u l d the disparate districts
w i l l i n g l y provide the financial support w h i c h the n e w
c e n t r a l government w o u l d sorely n eed?

H o w w o u l d this

affe c t c o operation a m o n g the component parts of such a
n e w l y independent state?

This m a y he one a mong m a n y

r e a s o n s w h y the M a r i a n a Islands Distr i c t has "begun
se parate talks w i t h the U n i t e d States to n e g otiate a
future status distinct fro m the rest of Micronesia.

As in the central legislature, the members of
the district legislatures have become conscious of the
political power they possess beyond the formal grants
in their charters.

Dor example, the first session of the

First Mariana Islands District legislature, in Resolution
Number 9-1969 introduced by Daniel T. Muna of Saipan,
attempted to pressure the U.S. into providing increased
financial aid for economic development, by directing this
resolution to the Soviet Union via the United Nations
Security Council.

The United States handled the problem

by ignoring it, but it is indicative of the kind of action
that district legislatures can initiate to aid in political
and economic development and placing pressure on the United
States.
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Political development has generally proceeded more
rapidly at the district level than at the territorial
level.

By 1963 all districts had functioning legislative

Bodies, while the Congress of Micronesia was not formally
established until 1965.

By 1972 all district adminis

trators were Micronesians, while at the territorial level
Americans still held the top policy-making positions.
Although it is true that the scope of district government
functions is more restricted that its territorial counter
part, the local level has provided more comrlete training
and experience in the overall policy-making process.

Thus,

despite the fact that American control over the output
of District government can he complete, the evidence
suggests that Micronesian involvement at this level is
promoting a limited degree of political development.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Consistent with the reasoning advanced at the
beginning of this chapter, the standard for evaluating
American policy in terms cf economic development is
provided by Article 6, Section 2 of the Trusteeship
Agreement, which indicates that the United States shall:
. . . promote the economic advancement and selfsufficiency of the inhabitants, and to this end shall
regulate the use of natural resources; encourage the
development of fisheries, agriculture and industries:
protect the inhabitants against the loss of their
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land and resources: and improve the means of trans
portation and communication . . . .
The central question, then, becomes:

How and

to what extent has the United States promoted economic
development and economic self-sufficiency?

While it is

beyond the scope of this study to describe all economic
development projects, an overall assessment of U.S.
policy in the economic sphere will be attempted.
The most basic and underlying causes of
Micronesia’s economic problems may be a lack of capital
coupled with poor economic development potential.

The

two primary sources of capital in Micronesia, are U.S.
appropriations and, secondarily, private American invest
ment.

The history of U.S. allocations for the territory

has been depicted in Table 4.

It is evident that before

1962 the funds actually appropriated fell well under the
$7.5 million maximum imposed by the American Congress.
After 1962, the budget ceiling as well as the actual
appropriations jumped considerabl7y.

The implications

this held for economic development were clear.

Before

1962 appropriations barely covered administrative expenses,
S7
the result being little or no economic development."'
President Kennedy’s policy reassessment is reflected in
the budgetary increases noted above.

The U.S. has empha

sized this oolicjr shift in its annual reports to the
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United Nations:
In 1962, a major shift in the direction and
scope of the Administering Authority’s commitment in
Micronesia led to increased appropriations from the
U.S. Congress to facilitate more rapid development.
Accordingly, the previous ceiling of $7.5 million
was raised to $17.5 million. An accelerated program
was set in motion for emerging construction and staff
ing of school facilities along with efforts to
improve health standards and provide a general up
grading and integrated development of essential
public services embracing transportation, communi
cations, water and power resources.^
The effects of this policy alteration can be
demonstrated by describing the changes recorded in the
U.S. position regarding industrial and business develop
ment in Micronesia.

Before 1962, U.S. policy was aimed

at establishing industries manned by indigenes who were
to be trained in management skills and encouraged to
take over completely as soon as possible.

Only businesses

financed hy Micronesians or by the government were
acceptable since all foreign investments, including those
of U.S. citizens, were banned.

But the policy shift in

1962 allows private U.S. capital to be invested, subject
to government controls which ensure Micronesian partici
pation in employment, management, and investment oppor
tunities.^

Other foreign investment (non-U.S.) is still

excluded, while the total ban on foreign purchasing of
land (including the U.S.) has been continued.^0

The

policy change indicates that the United States is officially
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interested in initiating and encouraging economic
enterprises which Micronesians will eventually own and
operate.

Situs private American investments are a major

source of capital in Micronesia.

She level of U.S.

investment may be indicative of the extent of the
territory's financial dependence on continued Axaerican
involvement in the islands.

According to testimony-

given by the High Commissioner before the U.S. Senate,
the figure was about $28 million in 1972.61
'The second basic cau.se of Micronesia's economic
problems may be its poor economic development potential,
Sincs ';!orld War li, scrap metal has been one of the
territory’s leading exports.

But, since the supply is

the income derived from its sale is
decreasing rapidly.

Obviously, an economy which is even

partially dependent on a resource whose supply is so
limited needs alternative sources of income.

Has

American policy been directed toward developing such
alternatives with the ultimate goal of bringing the area's
economy to a state of self-sufficiency?
U.S. economic objectives for Micronesia have beerprovided in its annual reports to the United Hations.
■The American administration has pledged to promote develop
ment in food production, transportation and communication,
tourism, wages and employment conditions, resource
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development, native 'businesses, and investment in
private enterprises.

A succinct statement of these

objectives was provided in the 1971 report to the United
Uations:
. . . increasing food production through improve
ment of crop farming and encouraging use of local
materials for house, school and dispensary construc
tion, furniture and handicraft.
. . . developing transportation and communications
systems to overcome community isolation, increase
educational opportunity, promote higher standards of
family and community life and provide adequate and
uninterrupted air—and-sea logistic support of the
i sland c oimnunit i es .
. . . encouraging development of tourism together
with personnel and facilities needed for tourism.
. . . maintaining a wage structure and employment
conditions consonant with the advancing social and
economic conditions of the Trust Territory; this
structure to os based on periodic economic surveys
and cost-of-living studies.
. . . reserving to the inhabitants their land
and resources by applying appropriate controls and
constraints so that land use plans and patterns will
achieve optimum use of land resources.
. . . providing the basic physical and resource
developments necessary for economic growth expanding
a Trust Territory-wide construction program which
includes rehabilitating and building reads, airports,
and harbor facilities; and improving and expanding
water, electrical, sanitary and other basic utilities.
. . . encouraging hicronesians to establish their
own business enterprises by providing them with
necessary technical assistance and long-term loans.
These enterprises include establishment of cooperatives,
small home industries, expanded production of handi
crafts, search for markets, and instruction in
modern methods of production.
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. . , providing for capital participation in
economic enterprises which are otherwise beyond the
financial capacity of local investors by providing
an economic climate which will allow business,
commerce, and industry a profit while providing pro
ductive employment opportunities for Micronesia’s
growing population. Enterprises which may require
such participation include commercial transportation,
hotel and travel facilities, fisheries, large-scale
tropical agriculture production, food processing,
and small fabricating and manufacturing industries.52
One indication of deepening American interest
in economic development came in 1967 when the U.S. Govern
ment commissioned a private consulting firm, Robert R.
Nathan Associates, Inc., to analyze Micronesia’s economy
and recommend measures it felt would assure economic
growth.

The Economic Development Plan for Micronesia,

more commonly called the ’’Nathan Report", was published-.
in February of 1967.

The Parameters which influenced

the report were "the political future of Micronesia,
policies related to outside investment, land ownership
and use, the quality and the quantity of the existing
labor force and the attitude and organization of the
administration."

61

The report recommended broad changes

throughout Micronesia’s econonry including the development
of an improved infrastructure, particularly transportation.
Since qualified personnel were seen as absolutely essential,
it was recommended that skilled labor should be imported
if necessary.

The report indicated that since indigenous

and U.S. capital were inadequate, foreign capital— and, for
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that matter, foreign labor and management— should he
imported to stimulate enterprises which would otherwise
not he 'viable.
foreigners.

Land ownership should he opened to

Education should he geared to an under

standing of the importance of economic growth to develop
ment as a whole.

Transportation needs to he improved.

Present resources should he developed and utilized.
"There must he high, p r i o r i t y emphasis to direct economic
stimulation: more intensive management assistance; more
liberal loans and loan guarantees; more experiments with
selected pilot and demonstration enterprises; more
encouragement of outside investors."

64-

The report

recommended administrative reorganization of the High
Commissioner's office along lines which would facilitate
66
the implementation of the recommendations noted above. J
The administrative suggestions were quite specific, hut
none of these recommendations have been implemented.^
It should he pointed out that American policy
makers have successfully promoted the development of
Micronesia’s leading export, copra,.

The Copra Stabili

zation Fund, as it is now called, was initiated in 1952
when the United States contracted a private American firm
to operate the service.

Originally financed bjr a U.S.

grant, the fund was established to control or subsidize
prices paid to copra producers with a view toward pro
tecting them from the vissicitudes of world market prices.
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Micronesians were gradually encouraged to participate in
the operation and management of the fund, and by 1966
a corporation which was 60 per cent owned by Micronesians
received, the contract to operate the fund.0^

In that same

year each of Micronesia's districts gained representation
on the B o a r d , T h i s is one area where U.S. policy has
been notably successful in that the fund is now selfsustaining; i.e. if Micronesia becomes independent, the
personnel and monies needed to operate the fund would be
present even without U.S. support.
Tourism is one area that has been singled out
by U.S. policy-makers as possessing great development
potential.

Indeed, in 1970 tourism replaced copra as

the territory’s largest export income earner.

The

tremendous growth of the tourist industry is recorded
in Table 8 which depicts the number of entries into
Micronesia from 1965 to 1972. About two-thirds of the
tourists came from the United States, while the other
one-third originated their journeys in Japan.^

The

stated American goal is to ensure that the tourist
industry "be developed in line with the desires of each
D i s trict and that the d o l l a r r e t u r n to M i c r o n e s i a is

more than just for hotel emplojrees or boat owners."

70

Micronesians themselves look on the tourist boom as a
mixed blessing.

They understand that the exploitation

of this "natural resource" is an important, even compelling,
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Table 8
Tourist Entries Into the Trust
Territory, 1965-1972

bumber of Entries

Calendar Year
1965 . . . . . .
1966 ...........
1967 ...........
1968 ...........
1969 ...........
1970 ...........
1 9 7 1 ...........
1972 . . . . . .

............. 5,70.0
.............
9,000
............. 13,000

Source:
United States, Department of State, 24th Annual
Renort to the United Nations on the Administration of the
Pacific Islands. July 1, 1970 to June 30, 1971 (Washington
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 51; and
United States, Department of State, 25th Annual Report to
the "United Nations on the Administration of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands, July 1, 1971 to"June 30.
1972' (Washington, D.O.:
O-overnment Printing: Office, 1973 )

v.

A5.

step along the path to economic development and selfsufficiency.

Rut some islanders have expressed fears

that much a course will, inevitably result in the
,fAmericanization" of the territory.

71

They fear that

their indigenous culture may he trampled under commer
cialized efforts to make Micronesia more attractive
to tourists.

Nonetheless, tourism does possess great

potential for the territory’s economic development.

It

accounted for 82 million of the 863.8 million Gross
Territorial Product in 1970.
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However, these positive observations should he
balanced by a consideration of the growing trade deficit
which exists in the Trust Territory.

Before the policy

change in 1962 the value of exports and imports were
roughly equal (although there has been some trade deficit
every year since 1956.)

The value of imports has since

grown dramatically, from 13,140,762 in 1962
126,334,062 in 1972.7^

73

to

The value of exports also in

creased, but at a slower rate, growing from $1,765,343
in 196275 to $2,636,735 in 1972.76

Tables 9 and 10

indicate how these exports are distributed according to
the product and the country to which it was sent.
According to Table 9, copra is by far the territory's
leading export, all of it being sold to Japan..

Pish, a

very distant second, is shipped primarily to the United
States.

Total exports are approximately evenly divided,

with about half going to the U.S. and half to Japan.

On

the import side, Table 10 indicates that over half of
Micronesia.'s incoming trade is with the United States,
while about one-third is with Japan.

The territory relies

heavily on outside sources for both processed food and
grain, getting almost twice as much from the U.S. as from
Japan.

Manufactured goods, machinery, building materials,

oil products, and assorted beverages account for the
remainder of Micronesia's imports.
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The significance of the $23.7 million trade
deficit lies in how it is absorbed. According to the
Nathan Report, sources of income flowing into Micronesia,
at estimated annual rates for the years 1965 to 1967,
totalled $12.3 million annually.

About 73 percent of

this amount ($9 million) was accounted for by direct
Trust Territor3r Government expenditures (net).

Copra

exports accounted for $2.5 million annually, while all
other exports accounted for $760,000 annually.

The last

component was the $70,000 annually which resulted from
expenditures of travellers in those years.

77

Thus, the

growing trade deficit is being financed by the United
States through the annual appropriations from the American
Congress noted earlier.
What impact could this situation have on
Micronesia’s political future?

The probable unwillingness

on the part of the U.S. Congress to continue to appro
priate funds for an independent Micronesia has been
described earlier.

Since the U.S. has seemed reluctant

to provide money when the Trusteeship Agreement and the
U.U. Charter imposed some obligation on it, it is doubtful
that the Congress would remain willing to continue appro
priations should the obligation be removed.

In such a

situation, trade could not be continued at the present
level.

Since the funds necessary to pay for imports over
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the value of exports would no longer be available, the
level of imports would of necessity be drastically
curtailed.

Therefore, as a result of the trade deficit

which has developed under American administration,
Micronesia has become more dependent on the United States.
It is further possible that American ta,riff policy
has, whether intentionally or not, restricted Micronesia’s
economic development.

As noted above, foreigners cannot

own land in Micronesia.

But since 1962 they have beer-

permitted to establish businesses and corporations and
make investments in the territory, provided certain
conditions are met which are intended to protect the
Micronesians.

Such conditions include providing adequate

crrportunities for Micronesian employment and management
in these enterprises and allowing Micronesian capital
to be invested.

The reasoning of the administration is

that each new enterprise should not only?" materially^
contribute to Micronesia's economic development, but
also should play a role in ultimately promoting economic
self-sufficiency.

The Van Camp Sea Pood Corporation has

attempted to meet these conditions by training and
employing Micronesians.

But the tariff uolic2r alluded

to above has stalled the development of processing plants
and fish canneries in Micronesia,— processed fish are
subject to a tariff when leaving the trust territory while
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unprocessed fish are not subject to tariff.

In order to

avoid the tariff, Van Camp merely freezes the fish in
Micronesia and then ships it tariff-free to other ports
outside the territory for processing and canning.^8

This

suggests that while the stated U.S. objective is to compel
foreign firms to promote economic development, it inhibits
these efforts by imposing this tariff policy.
One measure of the level of activity in any
economy is its gross product, the total value of all
goods and services available for consumption and invest
ment.

Because of measurement problems airising from, the

subsistence nature of some segments of the Micronesian
economy, the Gross Territorial Product (GTP) had not
been compiled before the Nathan Report was issued.

At

that point the GTP was analyzed at estimated annual rates
over the period from 1965-1967.

The authors of the Nathan

Report concluded that the average annual GTP from 1965 to
1967 was $38.3 million (or $24.7 million excluding net
additions to capital facilities.)^

They indicated that

the U.S. Government contributed 47 percent of this total
figure.80

By 1970 the GTP had grown to $63.8 million

(not including net additions to capital facilities.)8'*'
-According to the 1971 report to the United Nations, the
increase from 1965-1967 to 1970 was " . . . primarily
brought about b3r an increase in government expenditures.f’88
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This discussion of the C-TP indicates that the United
States is directly responsible for a major part of the
activity within and growth of the Micronesian economy,
and that continued American involvement is essential if
the economy is to continue to grow at its present rate.
Perhaps another indication of activity and
expansion within the Micronesian economy is the territory's
national income.

The figures shown in Table 11 were

provided by the administration only through 1969, due
to a measurement problem caused by the fact that a
large portion of Micronesia's population (28,000 people)
,°3

are engaged in subsistence agriculture.''

According to

the 1972 report to the united Nations, :1. . . since so
much of the income of the people of the Territory is
computed on a subsistence basis, statistics tend to be
somewhat meaningless."0^ Nevertheless, the data in Table 11
have been included to provide an overview, however
limited, of the Micronesian economy.

Between 1952 and

1962, the territory's national income increased by only
93.8 million.

In the period following the policy change

in 1962 until 19-59 when these data were no longer reported,
the increases totalled about $11 million.

Although these

increases are indeed significant, a proper perspective
can be maintained and a better understanding of the problem
achieved by remembering that U.S. investments in 1972
amounted to $28 million.
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Table 11

national Income of the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands, 1952-19691

Fiscal Year
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

Matronal income (in dollars)

......................... .
. . . . . ................
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
................
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................
..........................

2 ,310,000
2.163,100
2,305,400
3,181,745
3,234,172
3,456,000
3,720,000
3,660,000
4,559,671
5,538,100
6,138,000
7,589,120
7,589,000
10,257,000
10,746,000
11,370,000
14,904,672
18,247,872

1.

These data do not include United States employees’
salaries.

2.

Data for 1952-1959 do not include figures for Saipan.

Sources: United States, Department of State, Annual
Reports to the United Mations on the Administration of
the TrtisT"Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each
respective year— 1956, p. 53; 1963, p. 48; 1968, p. 42;
1969, p. 44.
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By way of summary, the evidence indicates that
despite large increases in U.S. appropriations and notable
success with the Copra Stabilization Fund, American
economic policy, rather than promoting self-sufficienc2r
for the Micronesian economy, has actualljr increased the
territory's dependence on continued American administration
of the islands and on some political status which would
insure its economic viability in the future.
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
The general standard that will be used to evaluate
this phase of American policy is that section of Chapter
XII, Article 76(b) of the United Nations Charter, which
charges the United States a.nd all other member-states
administering trusteeships to promote the social develop
ment of the inhabitants.

A more specific standard is

provided b?/ the obligation the United States imposed on
itself when it signed the Trusteeship Agreement.
Article 6, Section 3 of that document states that the
United States shall:
, . . promote the social advancement of the
inhabitants, and to this end shall protect the rights
and fundamental freedoms of all elements of the
population without discrimination; protect the health
of the inhabitants; control the traffic in arms and
ammunition, opium and other dangerous drugs, and
alcohol and other spiritous bevera.ges; and institute
such other regulations as may be necessary to protect
the inhabitants against social abuses . . . .85
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Several components of this pledge can he
dispensed with immediately/,

No information is available

regarding the control of the traffic in arms and ammunition.
Important drugs to he used, for medical purposes must be
channeled through the district director of public health,
but no drugs at all are produced within the territory/.8^
Although no alcoholic beverages were imported under the
Japanese administration before World War II, the Americans
had allowed the incoming trade in beer and alcoholic
spirits to climb to a level of $1,688,907 byr 1972.8^
The Micronesian economy and culture have tradi
tionally relied on subsistence agriculture.

Western

attitudes of free-wheeling competition and private
enterprise are alien to many/ of the islanders.

Indeed,

as noted above, according to 1971 government estimates,
approximately 28,000 Micronesians rely/ on subsistence
agriculture for their livelihood,88 while less than half
that number is engaged in employment for wages.88
Ethnically, most of the people of the territory
are classified as Micronesians, with the exception of
1,000 Polynesians who inhabit Kapingamarangi and Hiikuoro
Islands.

Differences in custom do exist, as testified

to by the existence of nine major languages.80

Put a

certain cultural homogeneity/ is exhibited throughout the
territory.

However, it should be pointed out that under
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American administration, some of the native culture appears
to he "breaking down.

For example, manj7 of the islanders

have succumbed to Western influences and foresalcen their
traditional island housing of grass huts for corrugated
metal shacks in shanty towns surrounding concentrations
of American population, especially in the district
centers.^"

Some Micronesians maintain that the indigenous

culture in these areas has been jeopardized by the
American impact,

According to Philip W, Quigg, some

indigenous leaders feel that the U.S. is:
. . . irreparably/ affecting their societ^r—
almost unthinkingly and often without consulting
them. They feel overwhelmed by the impact of America
and the Americans. Their poignant hope of preserving
their culture while achieving the good things of the
modern world will not be realized; they know that
the outcome will be a fluid and unsatisfactory com
promise, but they would like to feel that they have
some control over their own destiny.92
In an attempt to bring representational democracy/ to the
islands, the United States has altered the pattern of
traditional authority.

By supplanting indigenous chief-

tans with elected, representatives at all levels the
United States has taken long steps toward implementing
this goal.
Some observers feel that these developments are
having an adverse effect on the territory’s youth.

For

example, one authority*- indicated that "they’re starting
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to grow up in a pseudo-American fashion.

The reason why

crime and juvenile deliquincy is on the increase is that
we are breaking down an archaic but efficient social
system that has served for centuries and we're not
replacing it."^

Another official observed that "regret

fully, the youngsters are so fascinated with mimicking us
(the Americans) that few of them have bothered to acquire
their fathers* skills as fishermen, or ropemakers, or
even as good islanders."

94-

In the field of social development, American
efforts have been directed primarily toward improving
public health.

A succinct summary of public health

policy has been provided by the U.S. Government in its
1971 report to the United Nations:
The public health program of the Territory is
intended to improve and maintain health and sanitary
conditions, to minimize and eventually control
communicable disease, to establish standards of
medical and dental care and practice, to encourage
scientific investigation in the field of health, and
to supervise and administer all Government-owned
hospitals, clinics, dispensaries, and other medical
and" dental facilities.
What elements of American policy/- could provide
a measure of the success or failure of U.S. efforts in
the area, of public health?

Two such indicators are the

levels of personnel involved in public health and the
financial support provided for these projects.

As can be

seen in Table 12, the level of indigenous employment has
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Table 12

Nonindigenous and Indigenous Public Health Personnel
Employed, by the Trust Territory
Government for Selected Tears

fiscal Year

Uonindigenous

1950
1955
I960
1965
1968
1971
1972

52
21
22
19
125
55
54

................
................
................

..........

Indigenous
259
327
485
600
762
1,023
1,140

Sources: United States, Department of State, Annual
Reports to tM.Dnited Hatlogs on. the Administration of
the Trust Territor?r of the Pacific islands, for each
respective fiscal year— 195*0, pp. 74-75; 1955, p . 81;
I960, no. 223-24; 1965, pp. 301-02; 1953, pp. 248-49;
1971, pp. 304-06; 1972, pp. 315, 317.
increased steadily, but the level of non-indigenous
employment, after remaining steady over many years,
experienced a sharp increase in 1968, although the number
had dropped somewhat by 1971.

The second indicator, the

level of expenditures on health, medical, and sanitation
services, is depicted in Table 13.

As in most other areas

examined, a change in American policy after 1962 resulted
in a sharp increase in the American commitment to public
health as demonstrated by the levels of financial support
provided.
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Table 13
Trust Territory Government Expenditures on
Health, Medical, and Sanitation
Services for Selected Years

Eiscal Year

1950
1955
I960
1965
1968
1971
1972

Trust Territory Government
Exp end i'tures

............................ I
............................
.......... . ................
............................
.........................
.
............................
............................

295,811-1
646,7580
886,715
1,955.074
3.437'427
5,805,000
7.432,000

1.

Does not include construction costs for hospitals.

2.

Exclusive of Saipan.

Sources: United States, Department of State, Annual
Reports to the United Nations on the Administration of
the Trust Territory"of"the Pacific Islands, for each
respective fiscal year— 1950, p. 71j 1955, (1956 report),
p. 155; I960, P. 203; 1965.
p. 298: 1968, p. 245; 1971,
p. 301; 1972, p. 312.
American efforts in

environmental health (that is,

directed toward the condition of living areas rather than
toward specific individuals) have been restricted to
projects in water supply and sanitary sewage disposal.

In-

terms of sanitary sewage disposal, the primary project
has been the waterseal toilet program, be,gun in 1965.
Although each district currently has the capability of
producing this toilet and providing it to its residents at
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a minimal cost,

C*£

its use is restricted to district

centers like Saipan and Kwajalein.

The success of such

projects can. he measured hy the extent to which the entire
population has public health services.

Table 14 indicates

that the use of protected water supplies and sanitary
sewage disposal is by no means widespread.
Another indicator of progress in social develop
ment is the condition of labor in the trust territory,
i.e. the level of indigenous employment for wages,

labor

occupies a critical position in the modernization of the
Micronesian society and economy.

The area's economy is

only slowly/ shifting from a, dependence on subsistence
agriculture to a reliance on emplojunent for wages.

This

changing emphasis is reflected by the growing number of
indigenes employed for wages in the territory.

If the

economy is to become self-sustaining, which it must as
independence or self-government approaches, the position
of labor will become more and more critical.

Table 15

provides an overview of the position of labor, both
indigenous and nonindigenous, in the trust territory.
These figures indicate that Micronesian employment is
increasing, both in absolute terms and in relation to
nonindigenous employment.

In 3-972, 13,917 Micronesians

were employed for 728,911,808 in annual wages, or the
equivalent of $2,078.87 per person working.

It should
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Table 14

Population with. Protected Water Supply
and Sanitary Sewage Disposal

With Protected
Water Supply

Pi seal Year
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

Humber

Percent

14,800
15,000
15,100
15,500
20,940
21,720
21,720
25,670
28,834

16 .7796
16.56
16. 3A
16.96
22.16
22.16
21.24
23.98
25.15

With Both Protected Water
Supply/ and Sanitary
Sewage Disposal
liumher

Percent

2,900
2,900
3,050 .
7,000
7,500
7,510
7.510
7,510
8,824

3.29%

3.21
3.30
3.49
7.41
7.66
7.35
7.02
7.70

Source: United States, Department of State, Annual
Reports to the United Nations on the Administration of
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each
resr'ec't'ive fiscal' year— 1'964, t>.' '273';' 196^f p. 307; 1966,
p. 310; 1967, t>. 264; 1968, nm. 170, 254; 1969, nn. 172,
261; 1970, op. 190, 283; 1971, *>p. 214, 310; 1972',
pp. 1, 322/ '
he pointed out, however, that this includes only a little
more than ten percent of the total population.

As noted

above, about 28,000 other Micronesians were engaged in
subsistence agriculture, which is well over half the total
working age population (men and women from 20-64 years of
age— 58,587 in 1972.98)
However, before the success of U.S. la.bor policy
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can be assessed, the extent to which the American Government provides employment must he considered.

As indicated

in Table 16, the Trust Territory Government, which is
funded preponderantly bjr the United States, accounts for
almost 50 percent of Micronesian employment for wages.
The implication, of course, is that U.S. action regarding
labor has increased Micronesia’s dependence on continued
American administration of the islands.

It is further

interesting to note that a different salary schedule is
employed for indigenes as opposed to nonindigenes working
for the Trust Territory Government.

Nonindigenes are

paid according to the same scale as civil service employees
of the U.S. Government on the mainland.

But Micronesian

salaries range from a low of $1,260 per year to a high of
$19,84-7 per year.

99

Even this majr be deceptive, in that

only 88 Micronesians earned over $10,000 in 1972, while
429 earned over $5,000.^^

In other words, only 7 percent

of the Micronesians employed by the trust territory
government were paid at a rate of $5,000 a year or more
in 1972.
A capsule evaluation of U.S. social development
policjr is difficult.
successes.

There have been some notable

Eor example, the number of Micronesians

employed in the area of public health has slowly but
consistently increased at a much greater rate than
non-indigenous employment.

Government expenditures on
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Table 15

Humber Employed for Wages in
the Trust Territory

Piscal
Year
1955
1960
1965
1968
1969
3970
1971
1972

N onind igenous
NumSer
Annual "Wages
413
106
386
396
259
339
410
: 077

$

138,125
5 9 4 ,4AO
1,325,023
8A5,686
851,399
1,352,741
*
1,701,534

Number

Indigenous
Innual Wages

949
4,273
7,502
8,A50
9,214
12,436
13,866
13,913

$

378,265
3,220,455
7,104,741
11,924,101
14,741,099
20,550,544
24.213,409
28,911,808

*

Annual wage figures were not provided in 1971.

1.

Does not include employees of the Trust Territory
(rovernment.

Sources: United States, Department of State, Annual
Reports to the United Nations on the Administration of
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each
respective fiscal year— -1955, p. 18(7; X9'6’
0 , p» 921;
1965, p » 205: 1968. p. 243: 1969, p. 249; 1970, p. 2?1;
1971, PP. 30, 299; 1972, p p . 307, 308.
health, medical, and sanitation services rose dramatically
following the overall policy change in 1962.

But there

have also been failures, witness t;he small portion of
the population, most living in areas with a large number
of Americans, enjoying a protected water supply and
sanitary sewage disposal.

The level of Micronesian employ

ment for wages has also increased dramatically since 1962,
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Table 16

Total Number of Micronesians Employed for Wages
and the Part of This Total Employed by the
Trust Territory Government

Fiscal Tear

Total Number
Employed for
Wages

1955

1960
1965
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

2,639
4,273
7,502
8,4-50
9,214
12,4-36
13,866
13.913

Number Employed by
Trust Territory
Government
1,410
1.832
3,530
а ,233
4-^578
5,114
б,211

5,096

Sources: United States, Department of State, Annual
Reports to the United Nations on the Admini strat ion~of
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands," 'for each
respective'fiscal year— 1955, “0 . 18(T;’ l'9”60, p. 221;
1965, on. 253, 295: 1968, pp. 199, 2A3: 196% pp. 249
205; 1970, pp. 27l' 231; 1971, pp. 30,'257; 1972, pp. 307,
252, 257; and United States, Department of the Interior,
Annual Reports to the Secretary of the Interior. From
Keport, p.* 5;"7'rom ToFO Report^
But even successes like the rising emplojment levels a.re
flawed, since their effect has been to increase Micronesia's
dependence on continued American administration.

In con

clusion, the evidence suggest’
- that United States policy
has not been consistently directed toward the kind of
Micronesia,n social development which would, prepa.re the
territory for self-government or independence.
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EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
As was the case with regard to political, economic,
and social development, the U.N, Charter enjoins the
administering authorities ox all trust territories to
promote the educational development of the inhabitants of
the territory with a view toward self-government or
independence.

The standard that the United States

imposed on itself is provided, in Article 6, Section 4 of
the Trusteeship Agreement where it pledges that it shall:
. . . promote the educational advancement of the
inhabitants, and to this end shall take steps toward
the establishment of a general system of elementary
education; facilitate the vocational and cultural
advancement of the population; and shall encourage
qualified students to pursue higher education.m
including training on the professional level.
'
The United States has made the standard even more specific
by.promising to establish n . . . a universal free public
education system from elementary through high school,
with advanced training in the trades and professions for
those who can profit by further schooling."102
However, U.S. polic2r has not been consistently
directed, toward educational development.

As in other

areas examined, 1962 seems to mark the turning point.
Before that year only local funds— i.e. funds raised
through local taxation— supported elementary education
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(although the administering authority has always funded
intermediate education). Beginning in 1962 the central
government "began to share the financial responsibility?for supoorting elementary education,10' and by 1965 it
assumed totaJ. responsibility,101

fable 17, which compares

exnenditures for elementary schools by local government,
missions, and the Trust Territory Government;, indicates
this trend clearly.

As noted earlier in this chapter,

over 70 percent of the funds used by the territorial
government are supplied directly by the United States.
This, too, indicates that American actions have increased
Micronesia’s dependence on the United States,

Again, if

Micronesia chose independence and consequently the
American Congress cut off aid, most of the funding for
education would stop.

Therefore, if educational activities

are to continue at present levels, Micronesia must
continue to be affiliated with the United States in some
way.
The payment of teachers' salaries folloxved a
similar pattern.

The salaries of intermediate school

teachers have always been paid by the territorial govern
ment, but until 1965 elementary teachers were paid by
their district governments.

In 1963 the central govem-

ment paid a portion of elementary teachers' salaries.

105

But under the Micronesian Title and Pay Plan begun in 1964
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Table 17

Comparison of Expenditures for Elementary Schools
by local Government, Missions, and the Trust
Territory Government, 1961-1972

Piscal
Year

local
Government

1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

1201,644
249,458
261,339
249,563
22,850
19,457
28,365
21,718
38,962
40,159
62,030
140,336

Sources:

Trust Territory
Government
$124,798
74,533
97,478
70,963
105,836
142,596
64,838
136,002
16,093
146,227
258,794
228,954

$

■*

103,406
157,185
312,505
889,499
1,932,997
2,050,548
2,056,175
2,140,306
2,683,046
3,085,000
3,910,000
4,766,900

United States, Department of State, Annual

pp?"273-74;~1964, pi 299; 1965~, *p/332;^1966", 'p. 334;^
967, p. 286; 1968, p. 277; 1969, p. 286; 1970, p. 310;
1971, p. 333; 1972, pp. 349, 350.
the administration assumed total responsibility for all
teachers’ salaries including, of course, elementary
teachers.l0°

However, nonindigenous teachers are paid

approximately twice as much for the same work as their
Kicronesian counterparts.10^

There is an educational

factor which should be taken into account in this regard.
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In order for a Mieronesian to "become "certified” as a
teacher, he need only complete his secondary education
or get the equivalent of a high school diploma, while
nonindigenous certification requires a. college degree.
Is Table IS indicates, the number of nonindigenous
teachers has remained relatively constant over the last
decade and a half, while the number of Mieronesian
teachers ha,s increased considerably.

But despite this

development, the educational system has become more
'’Americanized”.

For example, the administration has made

English the language of teaching and instruction and has
instituted a formal program designed to make English the
lingua franca (i.e. the language of communication and
instruction) throughout all of Micronesia.*^®
The United States has conducted other efforts in
teacher training beyond the normal high school education.
They include scholarships for study on Guam and at the
East-West Center of the University of Hawaii and training
sessions held each summer within the t e r r i t o r y . I n
1963, the Mieronesian Teacher Education Center (MTEC) was
established and integrated with the public high school in
Ponape,

The curriculum was a combination of high school

work with a special emphasis on teacher training.~*^
Durinm fiscal year 1970. MTEC was repla.ced by the Community
College of Micronesia (COM)— also located on Ponape.

The
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Table 18

Number of Indigenous and Nonindigenous Teachers With
and Without Trust Territory Certification,
for Selected Years

PiscaJL

1954
1956
1958
I960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

Indigenous
CertifiNoncertifi
cation
cation
112
271
236
355
425
543
447
4.27
925
1,072
1,04-5
1,319

Non:Indigenous
Certifi
Noncertifi
cation
cation

263
198
285
255
34-0
138
489
631
128
174
262
182

67
22
59
94
123
163
270
284
24.9
247
24.1
303

10
98
29
2
1
5
3
3
6
12
22
87

Sources: United States, Department of State, Annual
Reports to the United Nations on the Admlnistration of
the Trust Territory ofthe Pacific Islands, for each"
respective fiscal year— 195 4-, p p . 167-68: 1956, p. 194;
1958, p. 256: I960', p .
238; 1962, p. 267; 196*, p. 294;
1968, p. 272; 1969, p .
279; 1970, p. 303; 1971, p. 330;
1972, p. 345.
CGI-I is a two-grear institution offering an Associate of
Science degree in Elementary Education.

The first 13

degrees were awarded in August of 1971, and an additional
36 graduated in June of 1972.

The total enrollment in

1972 was approximately 100 students.

111

Perhaps another measure of the U.S. effort in the
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educational field is tiie nuniber of schools and the number
of cliildren attending scliool.
information for selected years.

fable 19 provides this
Since the 1967-1968

school year, attendance has been mandatory for children
between the ages of 6 and 14 or until graduation from
119
elementary school.
in 1972 there were 208 public and
19 nrivate elementary schools with a total enrollment of
28,939.

Until 1961, the entire public secondary school

system consisted of only one high school.113

But by 1972

a total of 5,585 students were involved in secondary
education, with 4,217 attending the 9 public high schools
and 1,368 enrolled in the 9 nonpublic secondary schools.
She number of public intermediate schools in the territory
has increased from 6 in 1950114 to 7 in 1972, when 4
nonpublic institutions were operating,

fhe total number

of students in intermediate schools was 1,417, 1,348 in
public schools and 69 in nonpublic schools.
Although, as fable 19 shows, the absolute number
of children attending school has risen, the administration
effort has not kept pace with population increases.

For

example, in 1956 the number of school age children who
were attending elementary school was 94.5 percent,

3

but by 1971 that statistic had decreased almost 5 percent
to 89.6 percent.1'1'0
Another indication of the importance (or lack of
it) attached to education by the United States is the per
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capita government expenditure for education.

While it

is true that government expenditures in the field of
education have increased substantially over the period
of the trusteeship, the per capita expenditure has remained fairly constant, varying from $227.29 in 1952

117

to 1248.17 in 1962118 to $247.62 in 1966119 to $239.96
1 on
in 1972. “
Of course, if inflation is taken into
account, the per capita expenditure has actually declined.
The United States has made some effort to conform
to tha.t portion of Article 6, Section 4 of the Trustee
ship Agreement which charges it to " , , , facilitate
the vocational and cultural advancement of the population
. . . ."

121

Although no separate vocational school

existed until the Mieronesian Occupational Center (MOC)
1 2?
was established in Koror, Palau, in 1969, ~ some
vocational training was included as part of school
curricula as early as 1948.

123

However, it was not until

1959 that 2 years of mandatory vocational training were
required of all students attending the single secondary
12A

school in the territory. '

In 1965 a "full-fledged

vocational school" was incorporated into the public high
125
school in Palau.
The latest development, the estab
lishment of the MOC allowed a total of 304 students to
receive vocational training in 1972.

126

Its first grad

uating class (15 students) left the MOC in August of 1971.127
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Although the operation of the MOC is a positive U.S.
effort to provide vocational education, the scope of the
uroblem can he illustrated by comparing MOC's enrollment
(304) with the total number of school children in 1972
(36,195).
In the area of higher education, Mieronesian
students do attend, in addition to the COM, institutions
of higher learning outside the trust territory.

Table 20

depicts the number of Mieronesian students studying
abroad for selected jrears.

In 1972, of the 778 students

involved, 342 were in Guam, 193 were on the TJ.S. mainland,
and 172 were in H a w a i i . T h e remainder were located
in Fiji, the Philippines, and Papua—New Guinea.

129
'

About

40 percent of these Mieronesian students living abroad
were studying either in the field of liberal arts or
education, while about half that number were concentrating
in business, health services, or trade and vocational
.
ISO
skills. '
There is evidence which suggests that the United
States is painfully aware of its limited siiccess regarding
educational development.

It has attempted to disguise

some shortcomings by distorting certain dnta, in its
annual reports to the United Nations.

Specifically,

definitions, classifications, and data bases have been
changed from year to year— an action which has made com—
narisons over the entire trusteeship period difficult,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Table 20

Mieronesian Students in Higher Education
■by Sex, 1959-1972

Fiscal Tea.-r
1959
I960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

Male
107
103
118
113
145
168
228
205
235
27A
351
441
469
564

Female

Total

12
14
14
13
16
28
49
52
57
77
94
154
195
214

119
117
132
126
161
196
277
257
292
351
445
595
664
778

Sources: United States, Department of State, Annual.
Reports to the United nations on the Admin1stration of
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each
respective fiscal year--T9"5'9. p. U 42 : T7T6U, n . 257:
1961, p. 226; 1962, p. 264; 1965, p. 265; 1964, p p . 284286; 1966. pp. 317-20: 1966, p. 525: 1967, p. 278:
1968. P. 267s 1969, ni 27A; 1970, p. 301: 1971, p. 324;
1972; p. 339.
if not impossible in some cases.
SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter has been to summarize
and evaluate United States policy in Micronesia, speci
fically in terms of political, economic, social, and
educational development.

Although

a more detailed analysis
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will "be provided in the concluding chapter, it may he
useful to note trends at this point.
American policy in Micronesia has developed through
a series of phases or stages.

The beginnings of the

trusteeship saw a division of responsibility for civil
administration between the Wavy and the Department of
the Interior.

The first fifteen years of U.S. adminis

tration resulted in little development in any area.
Appropriations from the U.S. Congress, a fairly accurate
barometer of the American commitment to Micronesia,
remained at a. consistently low level below the authorized
ceiling.

In the 1962-1963 period a positive decision to

promote development in all areas was taken.

The best

quantitative evidence of its implementation is the dramatic
and steady increase in the level of U.S. appropriations
for Micronesia.
The problem which must be considered when evalu
ating U.S. policy is whether these increasing appropriations
really resulted in development.

The qualitative assessment

provided, in this chapter suggests that in many areas this
was not the case.

A detailed evaluation of these areas

will be orovided in Chapter 6.

Dor the moment, however,

it must be nointed out that the financial aspects of U.S.
policy have made Micronesia more dependent on the United
States.

The problem is whether this was intended or not.

This is one of the unresolved and perhaps unresolvable
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Questions regarding American policy in Micronesia;
i.e. given the 1062 decision to proceed with development
in the areas examined, there may have "been no alternative.
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Chap t e r 4

M I L I T A R Y A N D S E C U R I T Y FACTORS

This c h arter is intended to explain M i c r o nesia's
m i l i t a r y an d strategic
Initially,

importance to the U n i t e d S t a t e s •

the c l assified and for m e r l y u npublished

r o rtions of the

" Solomon Report" w i l l be examined as

w i l l th e i r implica t i o n s for A m e r i c a n poli c y in Micronesia.
The significance of the trust t e r r i t o r y w i l l the n be
examined w i t h rega r d to past and present U.S. militarjr
activities.

W h i l e great r e l iance has b e e n plan e d on

s t atements of m i l i t a r y spokesmen,

the fact that their

po s i t i o n s reflect a ctual U.S. p o l i c y w i l l be demonstrated
in the last part of this chapter.

A m b a s s a d o r Franklin

H a y d n W i l l i a m s was appointed b y P r e s i d e n t M i x o n to resolve
the status question.
neg o t i a t i o n s is the

(Indeed, his title at the status
" P r e s i d e n t ’s P e r s o n a l Representative.")

The p o s itions he takes,
a u t h o ritative

and the statements he makes,

f -derations

of A m e r i c a n policy.

are

Since an

e xamin a t i o n of the co n g r u i t y b e t w e e n the m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n
and the posture a s s u m e d b y A m b a s s a d o r W i l liams are vi t a l
to an analysis of the central hy p o t h e s i s tested here,

a

series of statements made b y W i l l i a m s w h i c h demonstrate
this

connection w i l l be examined in the last part of

t his

chanter.

Also included w i l l be a conside r a t i o n of

112
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several recent developments in U.S. foreign policy, e.g..
the

Nixon Doctrine, the growing resentment abroad against

U.S. bases in Javan and the Philippines, end the rever
sion

of control over Okinawan sovereignty to Japan, and

their implications for U.S.
the military significance
which the

policy.

Bearing directly on

of Micronesia are the projects

Defense Derartment has planned for the territory

and some very specific land needs it has expressed.
Finally, this chapter will consider various indications
of Micronesia's continued strategic importance as per
ceived by elements in the

executive branch of the U.S.

Government and reflected bjr the American position pre
sented at the status negotiations,

'DEE SOLOMON REPORT

In May of

1963 President Kennedy commissioned a

study group to go to Micronesia to analyse and review
U.S. policy there.

The group was chaired by Professor

Anthony M. Solomon of the Harvs.rd Business School.
the report was

After

submitted to the President on October 9,

1963, those parts of it dealing with economic, social,
and educational aspects of American policy were declassified
and. released.

However, the first part of the report

remained classified.

But, in March of 1971, a group of

Mieronesian stu.dents in Hawaii calling themselves "The
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M i c r o n e s i a n Independence A d v o c a t e s 1’ publi s h e d what they
m a i n t a i n is the first part

of that report, w h i c h includes

(according to the Independence A d vocates)
of the team,

:,the m i s s i o n

its un d e r l y i n g p urposes and recommendations,

and the ac t i o n plan on the future polit i c a l status of
Micronesia

It is of interest to note that

Francisco 1. Uludong,

a leader in the M i c r o n e s i a n student

movement

in Hawaii and a r e cipient of a U.S.

scholarship,

was deni e d renewal of his a cademic grant f ollowing p u b l i 
cation of the classified p o r t i o n of the report.
One of the initial contentions of the report is
that P r e sident Kenn e d y ordered a change in A m e r i c a n
policy in 1962 d e signe d to assure that M i c r o n e s i a wo u l d
associate i tself p e r m a n e n t l y w i t h the U.S.

in the future.

'The report asserts that:

despite a lack of serious c o ncern u n t i l quite
recently, Mi c r o n e s i a is said to be essential to the
U.S. for security reasons.
We cannot give the are a
up, yet time is runn i n g out for the US in the sense
that we ma y soon be the only n a t i o n left a d m i n i s t e r i n g
a trust territory.
The time could come, and shortly,
w h e n the pressures in the U N for a settlement of the
status of M i c r o n e s i a could be c o m e m o r e t h a n embar
rassing.
In reco g n i t i o n of the problem, the President, on
April IS, 1962, a p p roved N A S M No. 145 w h i c h set for t h
as US p o licy the m o v ement of M i c r o n e s i a into a
permanent r e l a t ionship w i t h the TJS w i t h i n our polit i c a l
framework.
In keep i n g w i t h that goal, the m e m o r a n d u m
called for a c celerated d evelopment of the a r e a to
bring its political, economic and social standards
into line w i t h an eventual per m a n e n t a s s o c i a t i o n

.2
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Thus, the Solomon Report disclosed President Kennedy*s
confidential memorandum which indicated a change in U.S.
policy and called for determined efforts to promote
Micronesia's political, economic, and social development
with a view toward achieving, not the U.K. goal of selfgovernment or independence, hut "a permanent relationship
with the US within our political framework."

The Report

further linked this policy change to U.S. security
interests.

The relationship between the military and

security value attached to Micronesia, and the U.S. posi
tion at the status negotiations will be examined below.
As noted in Chapter 3, changes were implemented by the
United States beginning in 1962-1963 in all the areas
enumerated in the Kennedy memorandum.
The focus of the Solomon Mission's investigation
and findings are related- to determining precisely what
actions the U.S. had to take to achieve the desired end.
It endeavored to answer three sets of questions:
a. What are the elements to consider in the
preparation for, organisation, timing and favorable
outcome of a plebiscite in Micronesia, and. how will
this action affect the long-run problem that
Micronesia, after affiliation, will pose for the US?
b. What should be the content and cost of the
minimum capital investment and operating program
needed to insure a favorable vote in the plebiscite,
and what should be the content and cost of the maximum
•nrogram that could be effectively mounted to develop
the Trust Territory most rapidly?
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c.
Wha t actions n e e d to be t a k e n to improve the
r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n the current Trust Terr i t o r y
go v e r n m e n t and W a s h i n g t o n an d to insure that it can
imple m e n t any n e c e s s a r y p o l i t i c a l strat e g y and land
de v e l o p m e n t p r o g r a m w i t h r e a s o n a b l e effi c i e n c y and
e f f e c t i v e n e s s ? -3

The w r i t e r s

of the S o l o m o n R e p o r t acknow l e d g e d

c e r t a i n pro b l e m s that are i nherent in the m i c r o n e s i a n
situation.
that

Perh a p s most

i m p ortant w a s the r e a l i z a t i o n

"the US wil l be m o v i n g c o unter to the anti- c o l o n i a l

m o v e m e n t that has
. . . .

just a bout

comp l e t e d s weeping the w o r l d

The Repo r t not e d the fact that,

should its

r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s be followed, M i c r o n e s i a w o u l d be the only
one of the o r iginal elev e n U.H.
w o u l d not g a i n i n d ependence

trusteeships which

or some kind of self - g o v e r n i n g

a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the a d m i n i s t e r i n g country,

but w o u l d

r e m a i n in a terr i t o r i a l n o n - s e l f - g o v e r n i n g a s s o c i a t i o n
w i t h the a d m i n i s t e r i n g authority.
arise f r o m M i c r o n e s i a ' s
ship".

A fur t h e r p r o b l e m might

status as a "strategic t r u s t e e 

The S e c u r i t y Coun c i l w o u l d p r eside

form a l endi n g of t r u s t e e s h i p status.
was v e t o e d in the S e c u r i t y Council,

over the

If this n e w status
"the US m ight hav e to

decide to pr o c e e d w i t h a series of acti o n s that w o u l d
ma k e the tr u s t e e s h i p a g r e e m e n t a dead issue,

at least

fr o m the M i c r o n e s i a n v i e w p o i n t .""3
B y w a y O-L summary,

one S o l o m o n Re p o r t r e c o m m e n d e d

that the po l i c y a d o p t e d b y the A m e r i c a n G o v e rnment should
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result in ” . . . having the Trust Territory affiliate
permanent 137 with the US . . . .

The Mission proposed

a five year plan which was to culminate in a plebiscite
which would result in Micronesia.’s permanent associa.tion
with the United States.

Although this timetable has not

been followed precisely, the Independence Advocates contend
that t? . . . the basic plan, and its policies, still go
7

on in Micronesia today.'"

The American Government has reacted to the relea.se
of this document by the Independence Advocates by claim
ing that it does not represent official U.S. policy, but
rather it is one of a series of contingency plans for
Micronesia.^

This qualified disclaimer, however, can be

placed in proper perspective and the a.uthenticity of this
document judged by comparing American policy before the
report was issued with policy following its issuance.
The evidence examined in Chapter 3 clearly indicates
that a very definite change occurred, after 1967-1963 inall four facets of U.S. nolicy considered, i.e. nolitical,
economic, social, and. educational.

This change is con

gruent with the recommendations of President Kennedy’s
confidential memo of Aoril 1962 which were alluded to
in the Solomon Renort.

Although this is not positive

proof of the authenticity of the classified portion
of the Solomon Renort. it does indicate that a dramatic
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change in policy similar to the one recommended in the
report occurred in 1962-1963.

The position of the U.S.

in the future status negotiations, considered in Chapter 5,
is also in keeping with the recommendations of the Solomon
Commission,

The American negotiators have consistently

opposed independence for Micronesia and have pushed,
instead, for a continuing association "between the U.S. and
the territory.
MICRONESIA’S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S.
The strategic significance of Micronesia in the
eyes of American policy-makers during and immediately
following World War II has been described in Chapter 2.
The United States was determined to deny the use of this
area to any potentially hostile foreign power.

leaders

then, as now, acknowledged that the trust territory’s
geographic position was one of its more important qualities,
together with, the dispersion of the islands over three
million square miles of ocean.

One spokesman for the

Department of Defense recently stated that Micronesia
"...

remains a strategic area in the central Pacific,

astride our principal lines of communication to allies
q

with whom we have treaty ties.”

The geographic signifi

cance of the territory’s position has been noted by many
others in the defense establishment.”^
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Some observers have ma i n t a i n e d that the de v e l o p 
m ent of the nu c l e a r and m issile age has i n creased the
n ee d for w i d e l y dispersed

oases fr o m w h i c h r e t a l i a t o r y

miss i l e strikes could he lau n c h e d a g ainst a n y offensive
a c t i o n from a hostile f oreign power.

They maintain

that the existence of such oases w o u l d deprive a n aggre s s o r
of the element of surprise since any s n eak a t t a c k could
not p ossible d e stro3r all these dis p e r s e d bases at once
(if there were enough of them).'*'1

Isl a n d bases w o u l d

serve an addi t i o n a l function,

th e y could fun c t i o n

i.e.

as staging areas for n u c l e a r submarines and vess e l s w i t h
atomic mis s i l e s w h i c h could a ttack v i r t u a l l y a nywhere
in the world.

IP

-

in terms of logistics,

island bases

are r e g arded by m i l i t a r y officials as i n d i s pensable in
limited w ars like K o r e a and V i e t n a m . 1 ^
Dur i n g Wo r l d W a r II, military,

a ir force,

and

nav a l installations we r e operated by the Japanese at
Saipan,

Tinian,

the Palaus,

P o n a p e , J a l u i t , Eniwetok,

and T a p in the west;

and

Kwajalein, ■Wot.je, and Ha l o e l a p

in the e a st.lz‘‘ M a n y of these bases,

es p e c i a l l y those in

the M a r s h a l l s a n d Carolines, we r e not of sufficient
importance to be included in the A m e r i c a n p o s t - w a r global
defense

system.

over

the U n i t e d States after the w a r were rec o n s t r u c t e d

ojr

However,

some of the i nstallations t a k e n

and put b a c k into operation,

lor example,

a former
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Japan e s e K amikaze a i r strip became the site for the present
Ya p airport.

However, m a n y facilities w h i c h were

s i vely damaged wer e not repaired.
on Truk,

e xten

The doc k i n g facilities

one of J a p a n ’s pr i n c i p a l n a v a l oases in the

Pacific, wer e v i r t u a l l y de s t r o y e d by A m e r i c a n b o m b i n g
d u ring the w a r and were not r e built."^
However,

from the ver y b e g i n n i n g of its a d m i n i s 

t r a t i o n of the territory,

the U.S.

m i l i t a r y facilities in the area.
Gua r d installations w e r e

did d e velop an d expand
A series of t hree Coast

e stablished in 194 4 a nd o perated

aft e r the w a r thro u g h an a g r eement w i t h the N a v y . " ^

'The

funct i o n of each is to serve as a i O R A H / 1 0 (ng)RA(nge)
]>I(avigation)_7 tra n s m i t t i n g station;

i.e.

t hey constitute

a long range n a v i g a t i o n syst e m t h r o u g h ’w hich the p o s i t i o n
of ships and aircraft are r ecorded by m e a s u r i n g the time
intervals b e t w e e n radio signals t r a n s m i t t e d fro m a net w o r k of rela t e d ground stations.

These s tations are on

R o n g e r o n Atoll, P o n t a g e r a s Is l a n d in U l i t h i Atoll,
_

K w a d a c k island in K w a j a l e i n Atoll,
some 500 acres of land."10

17

and

occup y i n g in toto

The existence of these

facilities indicates that there m a y be c o n s i d e r a b l y m i l i 
tary traffic in the area,

in the f o r m of ships and aircraft.

nuclear t e sting was
in the truste e s h i p period.

c onducted in H i c r o n e s i a early
The

’’s t r a t e g i c ” c h a racter of

the t r usteeship w h i c h allo w e d the U.S.

to close off areas
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of Micronesia for security reasons made the trust territory
a suitable test site, at least from the American view
point— so suitable that the Defense Department's Western
Pacific Test Center was headquartered in eastern Micro1°
nesia. ^ Bikini and Eniwetok Atolls v/ere chosen as test
sites because they were characterized by a degree of
geographic isolation and a downwind position that reduced
the danger of fallout to other islands.^

Bikini was

closed for securitj/ reasons in January of 1947 as was
Eniwetok on December 1, 1947 and again in the spring of
1951.21
Other military activities v/ere initiated in
Micronesia as the Cold War developed.

For example, on

Saipan the Central Intelligence Agency established a
training program for nationalist Chinese guerrillas.

22

In the late 1960s, at the direction of former Secretary
of the Interior Walter Hickel, the CIA installation was
converted Into a $600,000 "Civic Action and Public Safety
Center."

Such an action was initially suggested by

Marine General Lewis Walt -while he v/as on an inspection
tour of the trust territory.

He envisioned a civic action

program similar to the one that had been used in the
"I Corps" in Vietnam by Marines and Wavy Seabees.

According

to one military source, "a program of this type could
do v/onders in helping to develop the Trust Territory
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w h e r e lac k of c o m m m i c a t i o n and. t r a n s p o r t a t i o n has
isola t e d the islanders from one another as well as the
rest of the m o d e r n world.

M i l i t a r y engineers c ould help

24-

hu i l d b r idges h o t h fig u r a t i v e l y and l i t e r a l l y . n "•
’Civic a c t i o n t e a m ” was

M a r ianas, w here t h e y bu i l t a slaughterhouse,
go-round, a s c h o olyard flagpole,
pit.

One

sent to the island of Rota, in the
a merry-

and a co m m u n i t y bar b e c u e

Although m ost of the islanders appr e c i a t e d these

efforts,

some w o n d e r e d w h e t h e r the t eam wa s

In r e a l i t y

a g roup of public re l a t i o n s a mbassadors w h o s e

intent was

to pav e the w a y for future agents of the D e p a r t m e n t of
Defense.2"
P e rhaps the single m o s t important m i l i t a r y facil i t y
in M i c r o n e s i a is the one on K w a j a l e i n Atoll.

A n indi c a 

t i o n of the importance att a c h e d to this base

is the fact

that the Depa r t m e n t of D e fense has
d o llars b u i l d i n g it u p . 2 ^

snent about one b i l l i o n

This figure is all the more

s i g n ificant w h e n it is remem b e r e d that the l a rgest
a n nual U.S.

a p p r o p r i a t i o n for the entire trust t e r r i t o r y

w a s less t h a n 60 m i l l i o n dollars

(see Table 4. in Ch a p t e r 3).

The strategic s i g n i ficance of this base w a s expla i n e d b y
a sp o k e s m a n for the Depa r t m e n t of Defense w h e n h e testified
befo r e a C o ngressional hearing.
" . . .

Mr.

Dennis D o o l i n stated,

we have important m i ssile tes t i n g f a cilities in

the M a r s h a l l Islands, w h i c h contribute g r e a t l y to the
d etter r e n t posture of this country,

and for that r e a s o n are
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important also for the continued peace and s ecurity of
27

other n a tions of the free w o r l d . ” - '
The "base is engaged in a v a r i e t y of activities.
F or example, w h e n -John P. K e n n e d y "became President,
pushed the Hik e - Z e u s m issile p r o g r a m ahead.

he

Ewajalein

"became an interceptor site for m u l t i - w a r h e a d rockets
f ired from the U.S. m a i n l a n d . 28

However,

the Fike-Zeus

sy s t e m was roa.de obsolete b y the F i k e - X defensive missile
system.2 "

K w a j a l e i n is the site of the $165 mill i o n

M i s s i l e Site Rad a r Syst e m (HSR.), an integral part of the
A B M arrangement.

In this c a p acity it is involved in

mo r e tha n 15,000 operations a year,

serving as the eyes

of the S p a r t a n and Sprint missiles,

bot h part of the AB M

SO

system."

The A B M sjrstem is a v e r y vit a l element of

A m e r i c a n f o reign po l i c y and is p l a y i n g an important role
in the o n going Strategic Arms l i m i t a t i o n talks.

X w a j a l e i n ’s

p a r t i c i p a t i o n in d e veloping and tes t i n g the AB M system is
a p ositive i n dication of the strong strategic value
a t t ached to M i c r o n e s i a bjr U.S.

D e fense Department officials.

A n o t h e r indication of the inten s i t y of m i l i t a r y
a c t i v i t y on K w a j a l e i n is the size of the payroll issued
"to M i c r o n e s i a n s w o r k i n g the r e — over $2.5 m i l l i o n annually.
A l t h o u g h M i c r o n e s i a n s are employed there, no indigenes
live on the island.
Ebeye Island.

They commute d aily from ne a r b y

The only activities

conducted on K w a p a l e i n

are those r e lated to the U.S. m i l i t a r y establishment.

As
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a result of all U.S.

operations on the island,

the Trust

T err i t o r y Government collects about $2 m i l l i o n ann u a l l y
in sales and income t a x e s . ^

This suggests that the U.S.

presence on K w a j a l e i n m a y hav e made M i c r o n e s i a more econom
ically dependent on the U.S.
M i l i t a r y sources indicate that radio stations
are located on Ponape and P a l a u

32

w h i c h p a r t icipate as

communications relay netwo r k s for the Par East.

33

satellite tracking s t ation is situated on T r u k . ^

A
It has

b ee n reported that the D a v y m a i ntains a P o laris and P o s e i d o n
n u c l e a r submarine base on K w a j a l e i n . ^

One other type

of m i l i t a r y i nstallation is repo r t e d l y active in Micronesia.
Sabo Ulechong,

editor of D i d i l - a - O h a i , a P a l a u a n new s p a p e r

w ho s e p u b l ication has b e e n banned,

r eported in Au g u s t of

1969 that a chemical and biolog i c a l warf a r e testing
c enter w as operating on one of the islands in K w a j a l e i n
Atoll.

This same individual has r e p orted more rec e n t l y

that on Ifgerchelong A t o l l a

’’top secret m i l i t a r y i n stall

ati o n has been in operation for ne a r l y a y e a r and a h a l f
. . .

no one act u a l l y knows wha t kin d of m i l i t a r y project

is b eing c o n d u c t e d . ”

However, U l e c h o n g did observe that

’’there are a lot of G r e e n Seret tjgpes out t h e r e . iI^ D
Despite several attempts to contact this m a n for the
purpose of a cquiring more detailed information,
b e e n unable to locate him.

Incidentally,

I have

it was the Iligh

Commiss i o n e r who proh i b i t e d any further publication, of
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57

Drdil-a-Ghai.
nade

A l t h o u g h no p ositive

from tliis fact,

inferences

can be

it does imply that the U n i t e d States

,au v o e w secirotu c p m s oderaiopms as a k i s t o f o c a t o p m fpr
r e s t r i c t i n g fre e d o m of the press in M icronesia.

FUTURE STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF MICRONESIA
Some recent d e v e l opments in U.S.
have,

foreign policy

in the eyes of defense officials, m a t e r i a l l y in

creased the s ecurity va l u e of Micron e s i a .

One of these

dev e l o p m e n t s is the N i x o n Doctrine,

a n n o u n c e d by the

President

A c c o r d i n g to

on Gua m in J u l y of 1959.

P r e s i d e n t Ninon's

statement,

it provides:

First, the U n i t e d States w i l l kee p all of its
t r e a t y commitments.
Second, we shall provide a shield if a n u c l e a r
p o w e r threatens the free d o m of a n a t i o n al l i e d w i t h
us or of a n a t i o n w h o s e survival v/e c onsider v i t a l
to our security.
Third, in cases invo l v i n g other types of a g g r e s 
sion, v/e shall fu r n i s h m i l i t a r y and economic a s s i s 
tance w h e n reque s t e d in acco r d a n c e w i t h our tr e a t y
commitments.
But v/e shall l o o k to the n a t i o n
dir e c t l y threa t e n e d to assume the p r i m a r y r e s p o n s i g
h i l i t y of p r o v i d i n g the m a n p o w e r for its defense. °
In s u bsequent statements by the President,
D o c t r i n e was

e x plained further.

t h o u g h the Un i t e d States
commit m e n t s in Asia,

the N i x o n

It p r ovides that a l 

intends to h o n o r all its e x i sting

it wil l n o t und e r t a k e an y n e w form a l

obliga t i o n s t h e r e . T h e

U.S. will, w h e n necessary,

give

economic aid to A s i a n n a tions to o b tain social and economic
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r e f o r m in order to e r adicate the ba s e for g u e r r i l l a
activ i t i e s

/'r®

But A m e r i c a n g r o u n d forces w i l l not be

com m i t t e d to s uppress a d o m e s t i c i n s u r r e c t i o n in Asia.
Ac c o r d i n g to P r e s i d e n t Ninon,
e v e r y b o d y ’s b u s i n e s s — n o t

11the defe n s e

of f r e e d o m is

just A m e r i c a 's business.

A n d it

is p a r t i c u l a r l y the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the p e ople w h o s e
f r e e d o m is t h r e a t e n e d . ”^

Peace

in A s i a d epends m a i n l y on

A s i a n solutions to A s i a n problems.

At least in theory,

the

N i x o n D o c t r i n e p r o j e c t s a sharp d i s e n g a g e m e n t

fro m the

A s i a n la n d mass.^'2

25, 1371, P r e s 

In an a d d r e s s

on F e b r u a r y

ident N i x o n r e s t a t e d a nd i n t e r p r e t e d the N i x o n Doctrine:
That p o l i c y
to the world:

. . . represents

our bas i c a p p r o a c h

We w i l l m a i n t a i n our conmiitments, but we w i l l
ma k e sure our own t r oop l e vels or a n y finan c i a l
support to oth e r na t i o n s is a p p r o p r i a t e to current
threats and needs.
We shall prov i d e a shi e l d if a n u c l e a r p o w e r
threa t e n s the f r e e d o m of a n a t i o n a l l i e d w i t h us or
of a n a t i o n w h ose s u r v i v a l w e c o n s i d e r v i t a l to our
security.
But we w i l l l o o m to t h r e a t e n e d c o untries and
th eir n e i g h b o r s to a s sume p r i m a r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for
t h e i r o wn defense, a nd v/e w i l l pr o v i d e support w h e r e
our i n terests cal l ^ f o r that s upport and w h e r e it can
m ake a difference/'0
Huge cuts in d efense
to the N i x o n Doctrine.

s p e n d i n g are di r e c t l y r e l a t e d

P r i o r i t y a t t e n t i o n for the closing

of m i l i t a r y b a ses abr o a d is b e i n g f o c u s e d on the
defense l i n e ” w h i c h the U.S.

"forward

e s t a b l i s h e d a f t e r W o r l d W a r II
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fro m S o u t h Ko r e a to the Philippines!.
A m e r i c a n troops from V i e t n a m is

-The withdrawal, of

seer as lust the he ginning

of the process of t u r n i n g from the A s i a n m a i n l a n d .
th e r e is growing sentiment against U.S.
and. the Philippines.
mos t

Okinawa.,

Abroad,

b ases in J aran

once reg a r d e d as the

single

important defense p o s i t i o n in Asia, was r eturned to

Ja p a n in 1 9 7 2 . ^
Some A m e r i c a n strat e g i s t s are c onvinced the U.S.
m u s t m a k e o ther a r r a n gements

for m i l i t a r y bases.

g e o g r a p h i c p r o x i m i t y of S o u t h Korea,

Thailand,

The

and Taiw a n

to Russia, and C hina is p o s s i b l y one r e a s o n for A m e rican
r e l u c t a n c e to bu i l d n e w b ases there or to strengthen
a l r e a d y existing facilities.

Some observers have specu

la t e d that Micronesia, p resents one l ogical alternative
as a f a l l b a c k p o s i t i o n for the A m e r i c a n defense

system,

if indeed other bases in the Par Hast are terminated.
F o r e x a m p l e , Se n a t o r H e n r y R e l l m o n has

indicated that

"the strategic importance of the Trust Te r r i t o r y is n o w
gr e a t e r

(since the rev e r s i o n of O k i n a w a n sovereignty to

Japan) and is like l y to gro w r a p i d l y in the m onths a h e a d .n/‘5
Congressman Don
he

said,

H. Clau s e n echoed these sentiments w h e n

"Certainly,

this

(the trust territory)

is one

of the k e y elements of our s e c urity in the .Pacific.
C o m m a n d e r H a r r y ¥. Bergbauer,
C o l l e g e Re v i e w,

46

. . ." 1

w r i t i n g in the N aval W a r

explains that M i c r o n e s i a w o u l d be a central
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element in any new defense line in the Western Pacific
since its political condition would be more reliable than
that of American bases in Japan and the Philippines.

m

On this same subject, Commander Marvin I. Duke, writing
in the Marine Corns Gazette. also alluded to this possi
bility when he said that "since our grasp of the strate
gically important Western Pacific is obviously less
substantial (than the American hold on Micronesia), far
sighted planners are looking more and more at American
holdings in Guam and the U.S. Trust Territory in Micronesia
ta
as a possibly future line of defense."
If American policy-makers decide, as the evidence
suggests they may, that the fallback from the "forward
defense line" should he to Micronesia, such, a decision
would be consistent with the Miron Doctrine.

The territory

would, conform, at least in seme respects, with the primary
dictum, of the Mixon Doctrine— i.e. it is not in Asia.
However, it is close enough to the Asian mainland that
it could function, as a staging area for any American
military operations the President might deem necessary to
fulfill U.S. treaty obligations to some Asian government.
It is instructive to point out that Guam, wh ich is physi
cally but not legally part of Micronesia, has served as
a take-off point for B-52 bombers headed for Yietnsm, Laos,
and Cambodia.
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Former High Commissioner William R. Norwood has
indicated that some of the increased m i l i t a r y interest in
Micronesia, as evidenced by the presence of planning
'oartj.es from, various branches of the military establish
ment ? has-"been cone trued by both Micronesians and Americans
as related to the possible withdrawal of the United States
defense establishments from Okinawa and the need to redis
tribute American, military capability in the western Pacific
AQ
following the end of the Vietnam war.” '
It has been contended in TJ.S. defense quarters
that Ficronesian bases would, not be subject to the same
restrictions as are some of our other bases.

Fuelear

weapons are, according to the terms of the IT.S.-Japanese
Security Treaty, prohibited, in U.S. bases in Janan. Fo
American military operation can be mounted from there
without prior consultation with the Japanese Government.
7)efen.se rlerrers seem to assume there would be no such
restrictions on Ficronesian bases.

According to one

military authority, ”U.S. forces from this important area
could, provide a nuclear umbrella for our Pacific allies
without the restraint of any security treaty.

The Pueblo

was a perfect case in. point where re tall iat ory forces
could not be launched without prior permission from the
Jan an ese government.”^
At the time of Okinawa’s reversion to Japan the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

130

United States agreed to remove certain materials related
to chemical and biological warfare from, the island.

The

controversy which arose over the transport and future
destination of these materials left an indellible im■nression. on American nolicy makers. Some observers ha.ve
sueculated that Micronesia would he the logical 'dace to
store such materials— after the trusteeshin is ended.
Micronesian leaders have demanded assurances to the con
trary from the American renresentatives to the statu.s nego
tiations.

At a minimum the islanders propose that prior

Micronesian consent he reou.ired before any such materials
could he stored in the ares..
abruntly.

But they have been rebuffed

Throughout the status negotiate one, U.S. spokes

men have insisted on overriding these Micronesian objjec31

tiers.'

There is additional evidence to substantiate
the contention advanced in this study that military consid
eration? have influenced U.S. policy and the outcome of the
future statu? negotiations.

There have been a number of

soecific American plans for future military activities in
Micronesia, all of which assume not only/ a continued American
presence but also some residual authority which, would allow
freedom of action to meet future military contingencies.
In the fall of 1?69 G-eneral lewis Walt, Assistant Commandant
of the Marine Corps, stopped in Micronesia to look over the
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islands of Babelthuap and Peleliu in the Palau Islands
District on his way home from Vietnam.

Walt -was looking

for a site for U.S. Marine counterinsurgency training
bases.

He explained his preference for this area.

proximity to Vietnam made its swamps greener.

"Palau’s

It's 500

miles from the Philippines, 1,000 miles from Australia,
and there are hundreds of islands around for amphibious
52
It might be just what we want."
How

maneuvers . . . .

ever, this proposal was strongly opposed in a resolutionadopted by the Palauan District Legislature.

According to

one military source, "the mere mention of the military in
this area (Palau District) received an almost immediate
response from many Palauans who indicated that the coming
of the military 'would introduce a whole new chapter of
difficulties even while many problems caused by the last
war still have not been s o l v e d . A n o t h e r observer has
indicated that General Walt and his staff blamed this
rejection on a Peace Corps lawyer who they thought influ
enced the district legislators.

A colonel traveling with

Walt overheard the lawyer as he denounced the Vietnam War,
’which made him suspect in Marine eyes.^
Despite the fact that Walt’s plan was opposed by
the Palauan District legislature, the Department of Defense
has continued tc show an interest in the Palau Islands
District, especially in Babelthuap.

During the third
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round of status negotiations ‘between U.S. and Micronesian
renre sent at Ives, Captain William J. Crowe, Jr., TJSW,
spokesman for the Defense Department, indicated American
elans in that area when he said:
We would require an option that will permit
assured use of land on Babelthuap to "build structures
and store material. We do not have any immediate
needs for such a site but agreement as to availability
of such land will be necessary to safeguard our
contingency requ.irem.ents. Current site planning is
only general, and the exact location would be subject
to later negotiations.-"
The Air Force plans a. series of bomber bases for
Micronesia at a cost of about flOO million apiece, speci
fically bases for the following types of aircraft:
F-Bl-11, B-1A, and the Lockheed C-5 bomber.

B-52,

Furthermore,

there are plans for making Micronesia a part of the !!SafeSh
guard" ICBM missile system.' The Department of Defense
proposes to install a naval support facility in Malakal
Harbor which would be designed to service naval ships
77
in the Palau area.'

The military is very insistent that

a Use and Occupancy Agreement, which is currently being
negotiated with the Trust Territory Government regarding
78
Farallon de Medinilla island, be concluded, ' The
Denartmsrt of Defense further requires an option to hold
cq
military maneuvers in Micronesia.
This same department
has also expressed a desire to use a civilian airport
already in existence or Babelthuap for military purposes.
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An alternative acceptable to the military is the construc
tion of a new "reef airport” in the Koror/Babelthuap
vicinity, which would also be shared with the civilian
population.
Perhaps the best summary of the military value
attached to Micronesia can be found in a statement made
in the U.S. Senate in support of President Johnson's
resolution (S.J. Res. 106) of May 3, 1963.

At that time

Admiral lemos explained that the Department of Defense
considers Micronesia important to U.S. security because
of its geographic location, its use as sites for military
bases, and its facilities for weapons testing.

According

to Admiral Demos:
•■There are essentially three reasonsjwhy the
Department of Defense considers the TTPl important
to our national security. The islands are strate
gically located, they could provide useful bases in
support of military operations and they provide
valuable facilities for weapons' testing. Our con
tinuing strategic requirements in the Pacific and our
need to further develop United States missile capa
bilities will make the TTPI increasingly valuable to
United States security interests in the area . . . .
The strategic value of the islands of Micronesia
is, of course, based on their location. They cover
a vast area in a central portion of the Pacific Ocean
which lies astride or adjacent to our line of communi
cation to important allies and valuable bases in the
Western Pacific. The islands are a natural backup to
our forward bases in East Asia. Our major commitments
in Asia and our deployments in the Western Pacific
make it important that these islands be denied to
potential enemies. The lessons of the Pacific War are
clear on this point . . . .
The islands of the TTPI also support facilities
that have direct and positive utility in terms of
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U n i t e d States m i l i t a r y o p e r ational requirements.
C ommun i c a t i o n stations, n a v i g a t i o n aids, storage
areas, active air and h a r b o u r facilities a nd test
sites for o p e r ational ana d e v e l opmental-type
m issiles and critical studies and tests in support
of the b allistic m i s s i l e defense p r o g r a m are a few
of the reasons w h y the U n i t e d States Government
considers it important to m a i n t a i n a m i l i t a r y presence
in the area . . . .
lastly, the islands pr o v i d e a poten t i a l for m e e t 
ing a wide range of p o s sible m i l i t a r y r equirements
that could d evelop u n d e r va r i o u s contingencies.
As
a m a t t e r of prudent m i l i t a r y planning, we,are e x a mining
such contingencies on a. co n t i n u i n g basis. '

DEMISE DEPARTMENT LAND NEEDS IN MICRONESIA
The land used by the military in Micronesia is
part of the total land holdings of the Trust Territory
Government, referred to collectively as "public lands”.
According to the Trust Territor2~ Code, "public lands” are
defined as "those lands . . . which were owned or main
tained by the Japanese Government as government or public
lands, and such other lands as the Government of the Trust
Territory has acquired or ma,y hereafter acquire for public
purposes.”02

The courts in the trust territory have ruled

that this definition includes land owned formerly by
Japanese individuals, agencies, and corporations.^

Land

occupies a central role in Micronesian culture and folklore.
The importance attached to land ownership may result from
the fact that land is so scarce in the islands— the total
land area is only 701 square miles spread out over 3 million
square miles of ocean.

Since the natives of Micronesia are
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deeply attached to their land, the portion held by the
Trust Territory Government as public lands becomes in
creasingly important.

Throughout the territorjr about 60

percent of the total land area is classified as public
land.

The government holds as public land sizable portions

of many of the large islands in Micronesia (for example,
Ponape, Saipan, and Babelthuap).

The proportion of the

total land in each district held as public land is as
follows:

4 percent of the total land area in Yap, 13

percent in the Marshe11s, 17 percent in Truk, 66 percent
in Ponape, 68 percent in Palau, 90 percent in the
Marianas.^

These data are significant since such public

lands could be turned over to the military.
An even more interesting figure is the percent
of the total land area of Micronesia that currently is
either T,used or retained” by the U.S. Department of Defense—
3.8 percent.'^

A district by district survey of the U.S.

military land holdings in Micronesia is relevant to the
central problem being considered here.

Captain William J.

Crowe, Jr., USD, the Defense Department representative on
the U.S. delegation, has stated flatly that "there are no
lands being used or retained for defense purposes in the
districts of Truk, Ponape, lap, or Palau.”

The United

States holds a total of 13,824 acres of military retention
lands in the Marianas Islands District, divided between
Tinian (8,881 acres) and Saipan (4,943 acres).°7

The
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military has indicated that it intends to restrict the
future expansion of military facilities in the Marianas
to the island of Tinian.

An example of such projected

activity is the proposed refurbishing of some of the old
airstrips on the island as well as "building suitable
support facilities.6'
3

Presently, the surplus on Tinian

from World liar II includes four B-29 bomber fields, four
fighter strips, as well as old unused docking facilities.0''
In the Marshall Islands District the military has use and
Occupancy Agreements for a total of 3,031 acres, specifi
cally in the Xwajalein, Eniwetok, and Bikini Atolls.'73
The Department of Defense stresses the strategic signifi
cance of its land holdings in the Marshalls.

Again,

according to Captain Crowe:
. . . v/e have a continuing need for the existing
missile range facilities in the Marshalls.
They are
an important and integral part of the military re
search and development effort and significantly
contribute to the free world's defense.
There is no
prospect that the need for missile testing will ^
disappear, or even diminish, in the near future.

Although the figures given above are the present
Department of Defense land holdings, the total was higher
earlier in the trusteeship.

Specifically, 21,140 acres

have been returned to the Trust Territory Government, but
not to the Micronesians.'72

furthermore, the military does

allow civilians to use seme of the land if currently holds;
i.e. 4,441 acres, about 25 percent of the total land
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reserved for the military*- is .currently licensed for
73 "civilian use."
it should be pointed out, however, that
this land can still be recalled for military use.
INDICATIONS OP MICRONESIA'S STRATEC-IC IMPORTANCE
DURING THE STATUS NEGOTIATIONS
As indicated at the beginning of this chapter,
great reliance has been placed on statements of military
spokesmen.

That their positions reflect actual U.S.

policy can be determined by analyzing statements made by
the "President's Personal Representative" to the status
negotiations, Ambassador Franklin Haydn Williams.

Williams,

President of the Asia Foundation of San Francisco, was
appointed by President Hixon in March of 1971 and em
powered to resolve the question of Micronesia's future
political status.

13

r Thus, the positions he takes and the

statements he makes are authoritative declarations of
American policy.
Ambassador 'Williams has indicated that strategic
considerations are influencing the thinking and actions of
his government.

During these negotiations, he has made

repeated and pointed references to Micronesia's strategic
geographic location.

75

For example, in the Third Round of

the status negotiations, he said:
. . . it is undeniable that the wide expanse of
the Pacific embracing your (Micronesian) islands is
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indeed a strategic area. This has "been formally
recognized by the United Nations, and the history
of this century has already recorded that in fact
the area has been used for strategic purposes to
control the sea lanes of the Pacific and as staging
and .jumping-off points for armed aggression against
neighboring Pacific nations. The United States, as
a founding member of the United Nations, as the
administering authority of the TTPI, and as a member
of Pacific and Asian regional security arrangements,
has an obligation for the maintenance of international
peace and security and to guard against the Pacific
Ocean area being used in the future as a base for
aggression against the people of Micronesia or against
other friends or allies. We have this obl i g a t i o n . 76
Williams has indicated that security reasons provide the
rationale for American involvement in any future decisions
Micronesia might make regarding its political future; i.e.
the United States must be a partner in ,!any decision
which might have the effect of altering the stability in
the area which v/e hope to maintain in your interest as
v/e11 as in the interest of others, including our own."

77

At various points during the negotiations
Ambassador Williams has related Micronesia’s position to
America's broader and more fundamental security interests
in the world.

Pie has indicated that the United States

cannot and will not ignore its obligations in the Pacific
and to many Pacific nations during the status talks.

78

In a more positive light, it is maintained that Micronesia
can help deter aggression and participate in preventing
future wars.

The U.S. negotiators maintain that "an

important part of this effort is an effective U.S. military
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posture.

It Is not our intent to use the land ox Micronesia

for aggressive action against anyone.

It is our intention

to maintain a posture that offers the best prospect for
deterring a major conflict.

Surely, Micronesia can make

79
a contribution to this worthwhile effort."'-'

The American

Government, in achieving this goal, intends to exclude
other foreign powers from Micronesia.

The American nego

tiators insist that these U.S. strategic goals coincide
with those of the United Nations.

They reason that since

the objective of the trusteeship system is to strive for
international peace and security, and since the Trusteeship
Agreement (sanctioned by the U.N.) specifically acknowledges
the strategic significance of Micronesia, the United States
is obligated "to ensure the Trust Territory shall play
its part, in accordance with the Charter, in the maintenance
of international peace and security."88
The Nixon Doctrine, the reversion of Okinawan
sovereignty to Japan, and the growing resentment abroad
against American bases in Japan and the Philippines have
all influenced the thinking of members of the American
negotiating team.

They point out that these developments

compel the United States to insist on being a partner to
any change in status for the territory, whether now or
in the future.81

During the status discussions, the U.S.

has demanded certain reservations, certain assurances, that
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must be provided if the trusteeship is ended.

As might be

expected, the U.S. maintains that it needs full authority
to handle Micronesia’s foreign affairs due to America's
international responsibilities.

This need was clarified

by Ambassador Williams in the fourth Round of the status
negotiations when he said:
We believe that our clear authority in the
foreign affairs area is necessary in order for the
United States to carry out its Pacific Ocean and
World responsibilities for the maintenance of peace
and security and to serve and promote your own inter
ests in the international community. A clear under
standing of this point is also required to avoid the
possibilities of future misunderstandings and possible
conflict between our policies and your international
activities.”S 2
The U.S. has expressed similar reservations in
the realm of defense.

American negotiators are suggesting

that the defense agreement reached between the U.S. and
Micronesia should be formalised in a separate se c u r i t y pact
or lease that would continue even if the political arrange
ment between the two entities were dissolved.0^

Ambassador

’
Williams has been quite forceful on this matter, saying
:!. . . we do require the assurance that our land needs be
met in a manner that would be enduring through the terms
of the leases so that our continuing security responsi
bilities in the Pacific could be carried out.!’8^

On

another occasion, he again indicated that n. . . the United
States must have assurance that its basic defense interests
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survive any unilateral termination of the Compact."0^
During the status negotiations, the United States
has linked Micronesia's economic relations with the rest
of the world to American security interests.

Dor this

reason, the U.S. insists that it must control Micronesia's
economic interactions with foreign countries.

American

negotiators have indicated that, contrary to Micronesian
perceptions, "economic relations" concern more than pro
moting trade and economic development.

Rather, it may

touch 011 vital American security interests.

Again quoting

Ambussador ¥illiams:
Seemingly innocent trade or economic agreements ■
could conceivably . . . provide opportunities for
political penetration and the presence of foreign
elements which could threaten world peace and
stability, as well as U.S. defense arrangements in
Micronesia. As an example, although an extreme one,
the British Government recently had to expel a large
percentage of the Soviet Trade Delegation AMIORG
because they engaged in espionage^9.11a political
activities in the United Kingdom.00
In other words, to give some future Micronesian Government
the right to conclude such things as trade agreements
would be to give them the power to pursue policies
"...

that could possibly subvert U.S. security consider

ations."0^
Perhaps reiterating a few other statements made
by Ambassador Williams will summarize the position taken by
the United States during the status negotiations.

Referring
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specifically to what he calls "strategic rationale,"
Williams has asserted that:

the United States has security responsibilities
that relate to the realities and imperatives of its
broader role in the Pacific, its United Nations
obligations, and its other international commitments.
The central thrust of U.S. foreign and security
policy for the last two decades has been to deter and
prevent a major international conflict . . . .
Although the specific provisions of the Trusteeship
Agreement which made Micronesia a "strategic" Trust
Territory will some day be terminated, this does not
change the fact that the area will continue to be
strategically significant, and that security in this
critical area will remain important to international
peace.
Similarly, the United States basic obligations
to the United Nations to strive for peace do not end
with the trusteeship.
Therefore, we"believe that it
would be to our mutual benefit for the United States
to continue to have the responsibility for the security
of the are a .80
One other statement made by Ambassador Williams
is vital to this summary.

It represents concisely the

primary contention of this study, namely that strategic,
military, and security considerations will be vital,
even compelling, factors in the final determination of any
future political status for Micronesia.

"¥e have attempted

to make it clear," Williams said,

that our interests and obligations in the Pacific
are ones that will continue after the termination of
the Trusteeship Agreement and, for that matter, beyond
a possible revocation of a Compact which we both might
enter into.
Therefore, it is essential from our point
of view that our basic interests survive any future
termination and change in your status.8 -^
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SU MMARY

Although, detailed conclusions will he drawn in
Chapter 6 , a brief overview of this chapter is in order
here.

She evidence suggests that the united States

attaches a great deal of mil itairy and strategic importance
to Micronesia.

President Kennedy's confidential memorandum,

indicating that American policy was to secure a permanent
relationship between Micronesia and the U.S., and the
Solomon Report, proposing a plan to achieve this objective,
were followed by definite changes after 1962-1965 in U.S.
efforts to achieve political, economic, social, and educa
tional development.

Past and present American military

activities in the trust territory have enhanced Micronesia's
value to the United States.

The Department ox Defense has

indicated during the status talks that future military
activities requiring definite sections of land are b eing
planned for the area.
Recent i n ternational developments,
M i x o n Doctrine,

such as the

r e v e r s i o n of control over O k i nawan sover

ei g n t y to Japan,

and the growing resentment abroad toward

U.S. m i l i t a r y i n stallations in Ja p a n and the P hilippines
hav e caused A m e r i c a n po l i c y makers to consider alternatives
to the

"forward defense line" in A s i a established after

Wo r l d War II.

One a l t e rnative that has bee n menti o n e d
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repeatedly by military spokesmen is Micronesia.

The

evidence suggests that these statements do reflect actual
U.S. policy.

President Miron’s personal representative

to the status negotiations, Ambassador Franklin Haydn
Williams, has been empowered by the President to resolve
the question of Micronesia's future political status.
Therefore, Ambassador williams’ statements do represent
official U.S. policy.

The evidence presented in this chap

ter suggests that this policy is congruent with the state
ments of the military spokesmen noted above.

The American

position during the status talks as enunciated by
Mr. Williams is influenced by Micronesia’s military, stra
tegic, and security value to the United States.
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Chapter 5

FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS OF
THE TRUST TERRITORY
This chapter will describe and analyze each, alter
native future 'political status that has been considered
by both sides in the U.S.-Micronesian status negotiations.
The American and Micronesian delegations have met for six
rounds of talks since they first began in the fall of 1969.
(Table 20 lists the full membership of each delegation.)
As of May 1973, a formal agreement has not yet been con
cluded although a concensus on some basic principles was
finally reached in the fall of 1972.

It has been agreed

that "free association" is the political status that will
eventually emerge from the talks.

Several basic issues

to be included in the Compact, the agreement that will
formalize this status, are still to be resolved.

Table 21

depicts the chronology of the status talks and the places
•where they were held.
The alternatives considered throughout the course
of the negotiations include continuing the trusteeship,
commonwealth status, independence, and "free association."
The Micronesian delegation has always expressed a prefer
ence for free association, or as a second alternative,
independence.'1' During the second round of the negotiations,
151
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Table 21
Membership of Micronesian and U.S. Delegations
"to the Status negotiations

The U.S. Delegation

The Micronesian
Joint Committee

Arab, franklin Haydn
Williams
Capt. William <J. Crowe,
Jr., USB
Mr. Stanley Carpenter
Mr. franklin Crawford
Mr. Adrian de Graffenreid
Mr. Lindsey Grant
Hr. Herman Marcuse
Cant. G. J. Schuller, USE
Mr. Ronald Stowe
Miss Mary Vance Trent
Mr, Thomas Whittington

Sen. Lazarus Salii
(Chairman)'
Hep. Ekpap Si lie
(Co-Chairman)
Sen. Andon Amaraicli
Sen. Isaac Lanwi
Sen. Tosiwo Makayana
Sen. Bailey Olter
Sen. Sdv/ard Pangelinan
Sen. Ho roan Tmetuchl
Sen. Petrus Tun
Hep. Herman Guerrero
H e p . John Mangefel
Hep. Olter Paul

Source:
United States
tiations,

Office of Micronesian Status ilego"

'

21

ons, ¥

the United States offer ox Commonwealth, status was rejected
by the Micronesians.

p

Beginning with the third round of

negotiations, free association is the proposal which has
been given the most serious consideration.
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Chronology of the future Political Stutus Talks

Round of the
Status Talks
Sept.-Oct., 1963
January, 1970
May 4-3, 1970
October 4-12
April 2-13, 1972
July 12-Aug. 1,
1972
Sept. 23-0ct. 6 ,
1972

first Round
Informal "Execu
tive Meetings"
Second Round
Third Round
fourth Round
fifth Round

Washington, P.O.
Saipan

Sixth Round

Barbers Point,
Oahu, Hawaii

Washington, D.C
Hana, Maui, Haw:
Koror, Palau
Washington, P.O.

ice of Micronesian Status negotiations,
future Political Status of the Trust Territory, Official
Records of each respective round ox negotiations, Third
Round, pp. 1-2; Fourth Round, pp. 3-5; fifth Sound, pp.
20-21; Sixth Round, pp. iii-iv.'
COUTIHUEP TRUSTEESHIP
Of the original eleven trust territories administered
under the United Rations trusteeship system, Micronesia
and the Administrative Union of Papua and Rev; Guinea are
the only ones whose political status remain unchanged.
As a result, American policy has become the object of much
criticism as well as a great deal of pressure to resolve
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the status question.

Attacks on the United States have

come from relatively recently independent nations of the
"Third World”, whose newly won freedom from colonial
domination does not generate great sympathy for the U.S.
position in the trust territory.

These countries have

found an able and willing spokesman ir. the Soviet Union.
The Soviets use meetings of the U.l. Trusteeship Council
as arenas for laLinching vitriolic attacks against what thej'
claim to be American '’colonialism” and "imperialism”.
Mr. Ustinov, the Soviet representative to the Trusteeship
Council, has charged that ”. . .

the Territory was being

treated in the classical manner as a guaranteed outlet
for industry and a source of colonial raw materials which
provided substantial profits for ’surplus1 United States
capital.”"1 These "monopolies” are exploiting Micronesia's
human and natural resources.^

The Soviets further contend

that U.S. activities and plans are designed to make the
territory ”. . .

a base for aggression against the liber

ation movements for the peoples of South-East Asia, and
particularly Yiet H a m . k w a j a l e i n ’s conversion into a
missile test site and a radar installation designed to
intercept inter-continental ballistic missiles, coupled
with the eventual expenditure of one billion dollars on
this installation, are viewed as proof of United States
intentions.

The Soviets hold that America has subordinated
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Micronesian interests to its own strategic and military
concerns.0

lot surprisingly, the USSR las proposed the

elimination of military installations and activity within
the territory, pointing to General Assembly resolutions
which, asked administering authorities to refrain from
establishing new military bases and facilities in colonial
territories and to dismantle their old ones.

7

The Russians

are further incensed by the American refusal to allow
Micronesian students to accept educational fellowships
from other member-states of the United Rations.0

In 1967

the Russians announced that students from Saipan had been
offered scholarships to attend People's friendship Univer
sity in Moscow.

She Soviets view education as a necessary

element in the process of political self-determination:
The problem of education was directly connected
with that of independence, since the Administering
Authority was citing as a pretext for delaying inde
pendence the fact that the population was not ready.
It was obvious that the Administering Authority was
deliberately retarding the intellectual development
of the Territory's inhabitants in order to maintain
its rule over them . . . .9
finally, the Soviets have voiced consistent opposition
to any future political status which would result in closer
ties with the United States, including both annexation or
integration— whether through association or integration
(e.g. commonwealth status)— and statehood for Micronesia.10
The Soviet position may have been directed against Senator
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Hiram Hong of Hawaii who in 1965 advanced a proposal
calling for Micronesia’s integration with Hawaii, which
would result in statehood for Micronesia.

3ecause many

influential islanders feel that such an action would
result in the loss of a "Micronesian identity" in both
cultural and political terms, the proposal has received
no attention from either delegation at the status talks.
Consequently, the Soviets pressed hard for the establish
ment of a specific date for the administration of a
plebiscite to determine the territory's future political
status.1"
The point of the foregoing survey of the Soviet
position is to indicate that there is, and has been for
some time, a great deal of international pressure directed
toward the United States to fulfill the pledge it made
in 194-7, i.e. to ". . . promote the development of the
inhabitants of the Trust Territory toward self-government
12

or independence . . . .”

In other words, some change in

status must be made if the U.S. desires to bring its
policy in Micronesia into line with the overwhelming anticolonial sentiment of the international community of nations.
There is, however, some sentiment in Micronesia,
especially in the Mariana Islands District, for a continuing
close association with the United States.

For example,

J. C. Tenorio, a Saipan merchant, has indicated that "most
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people don’t want independence.
we are.

We're tetter off the way

On our own, our economy would be so weak that w e ’d

wind up like the Philippines— no stable government and lots
of corruption."

Rather, Mr. Tenorio has expressed a

preference for "going with the United States,
us want to.

We like the U.S."'^

lots of

Indeed, at least since

1967 the Marianas District legislature has expressed a
desire for some kind of permanent association with the
United States, even at the expense of seceding from the
rest of Micronesia.

In 1969 a plebiscite was conducted

in the Marianas which indicated an overwhelming desire
(3,200 for— 25 against) to affiliate with Guam in an
1A

expanded U.S. territory.-

The District legislature voted

unanimously in March of 1971 to secede from the trust
15
territory "b3r force of arms, if necessary."
There has
been no attempt, as yet, to implement that resolution.
During the fourth round of the status negotiations,
held at Koror, Palau, in April of 1972, the representatives
to the talks from the Mariana Islands District presented
a position paper in which they expressed a desire for
". . . a close political relationship with the United
States of America."'1'0

They indicated the reasons for this

position quite cogently and concisely:
We advocate our present position for the sole
reason that we desire membership in the United States
political family because of the demonstrated advantages
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of such, a relationship. More than any other nation
with which we have had contact, the United States has
brought to our people the values which we cherish and
the economic goals which we desire. Continued affil
iation with the United States offers the promise of
the ^reservation and the implementation of those
goals. . . ."17
To achieve their end, the representatives from the Marinas

District proposed that they negotiate separately and
independently from the rest of the Micronesian delegation
regarding their future political status."*® Ambassador
Franklin Haydn Williams, the President’s Personal Repre
sentative and head of the American delegation, agreed to
this proposal, subject to one limitation:

"our policy

of moving toward a termination of the Trusteeship Agree
ment simultaneously for all of the districts will remain

in effect."1^ Williams promised to keep the other parties
to the negotiations informed as to the progress achieved
in these separate talks.*-0 One peripheral consequence of
this prc—American sentiment in the Marianas is already in
evidence.

There is speculation that the "capital11 of the

territory will be moved from its current site on Saipan
(which is in the Marianas group) to Truk or some other more
appropriate site when the trusteeship is ended.

21

COMKOHWSALTH STATUS
One alternative proposed by the United States is
for Micronesia to assume "commonwealth status", something
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akin to the position of Puerto Rico.

Under this plan,

the Commonwealth of Micronesia, as the ares, would be known,
would be self-governing with a constitution to be drafted
X>j a representative convention and approved by the Ricrone-

sians themselves.

However, the constitution would be

required to remain consonant with the enabling laws passed
by the United States Congress.22

Horman Keller, an expert

on Micronesian affairs at the University of Hawaii, has
provided a capsule definition of commonwealth status:
It (commonwealth status) would allow the continu
ation of a Micronesian identity, while keeping the
region amenable to control of the United States. Pre
sumably, it would be associated with special benefits,
akin to the tax treatment now enjoyed by Puerto Rico,
so that economic, social, and political advancement
could continue at a pace compatible with the various
cultures of Micronesia. It could even be accompanied
with United States citizenship and free access to the
mainland of the United States for all wishing to
emigrate.23
In other words, this status lies somewhere between that
2A

of a state and that of an unincorporated territory. '
American spokesmen have pointed out that commonwealth
status does not imply a link between two independent poli
tical powers or units, but rather a consolidation whereby
Micronesia would actually become a part of the United
States.union.

Mutual advantages could accrue from such a
”. . . The protection provided for Micronesia in

the U.S. offer will insure permanence, protection, and
stability to the people of Micronesia.

Micronesia— whose
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history has demonstrated, its strategic importance to many
nations— will know, as will the world, that it is assured
of U.S. defense whenever needed at no cost to itself.
In a commonwealth, there would he a division of
powers and functions between the Micronesian and the U.S.
27
Federal Government.
The Commonwealth government, acting
through the Congress of Micronesia, would have broad
powers, especially in the area of internal affairs.

Indeed,

the Micronesian Congress would have full legislative
authority ”in the absence of U.S. or Micronesian Consti
tutional limitations or applicable U.S. law . . . .
That is to say, in all areas not claimed by the Federal
Government, the Commonwealth would be free to act.

In

terms of governmental structure, Micronesia would be
expected to establish ,!. . . a republican form of govern
ment, with three separate branches and a bill of rights
29
for the protection of the people.”
One important feature of the Commonwealth proposal,
at least from the American viewpoint, is that foreign
affairs and defense would be controlled by the Federal
Government.^0

This is explicitly stated in the American

proposal:*
The President is responsible for the formulation
and implementation of foreign policy for all of the
United States— the states, the territories, and Puerto
Rico. This would be true of Micronesia as well. The
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President, using tlie power and prestige of the United
States as a whole, seeks to follow a policy or policies
which will hring benefits to the people as a whole.
Although this power is reserved to the federal
government, this does not mean that Micronesia would
be cut off from the outside world or forbidden direct
contacts with foreign individuals and officials: quite
to the contrary. So long as Commonwealth interests in
such contacts are consistent with U.S. national policy,
the federal government would assist and encourage the
Commonwealth government.^1
The U.S. offer of commonwealth" status was rejected
in a 57 page report of the Future Political Status Commis
sion.

Ihe report, severely critical of the American

proposal, was approved by the Congress of Micronesia during
its regular session in August, 1970.

She Congress, backing

its negotiators, insisted on a much looser relationship
with the United States, !,free association."^2

The Microne

sian report gave several reasons for this rejection.

It

indicated that commonwealth status falls "well below the
minimum standards of self-government acceptable to the
Congress of Micronesia, the people of Micronesia, and the
United Nations."^

The report contends that "under our

present quasicolonial system, the identity, individuality,
and dignity of the people of Micronesia are being suppressed."'"

The report continues:

American power and influence are currently so
dominant that Micronesia and its people are becoming
"Americanised" at an ever increasing rate. This is
having a tremendous effect upon all aspects of Microne
sian life and society and it will be impossible to
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control this influence until the people of Micronesia
can establish their own government . ^
Some members of the Congress of Micronesia indi
cated other reasons for rejecting commonwealth status.
These included fears that a conflict might develop between
U.S. lav/s and Micronesian customs; that such a relation
ship would bind future generations; that ohe fifty per
cent of Micronesia's people who still function in a cash
less subsistence economy would be dominated by foreign
investors.
issue.

There was also growing anxiety over the racial

One senator expressed his fear, apparently held by

others, that Micronesians might become "the newest,
smallest, remotest non-white 'minority in the U.S. political
family.n^D

One Marshallese congressman remarked bluntly,

"I do not want any kind of American citizenship.
already a Micronesian."

I am

57

The report further noted growing concern over the
military issue.

"Security interests in Micronesia seem

to be the overriding consideration" in Washington’s offer
of coromonweaith status.

53

One observer has commented on

the perceptiveness of Micronesian leaders when it comes to
the American military interest in Micronesia:
Micronesian leaders have developed an uncanny
instinct for the incongruities and conflicts of the
American presence. They recognize, almost more than
Americans, the U.S. military interest in Micronesia.
They know that the Americans came in war, that they
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are engaged in w a r in A s i a and that, u p o n l e a ving
O k i n a w a and Vietnam, a n d perhaps the Philippines,
A m e r i c a n s might a g a i n pass thr o u g h the islands.
M i c r o n e s i a n s k n o w that the y are a strategic t r u s t e e 
ship, w h i c h the US man,- use for m i l i t a r y purp o s e s at
any time, as it r a t h e r u n a m b i g u o u s l y demo n s t r a t e d w i t h
n u c l e a r tests at B i k i n i and Eniwetok.
A l t h o u g h the y
w o u l d quite li k e l y y i e l d some land for A m e r i c a n m i l i 
t ary use, and ’would sure l y deny other powers access to
the area, M i c r o n e s i a n s bridle at any poli t i c a l status
that doesn't re c o g n i z e t heir u l timate s o v e r e i g n t y . ^

IUUEPENDEMCE

Afioga Afofouvale Mismoa of Western Samoa, the
only indigenous Pacific islander to become Secretary
General of the South Pacific Commission, recently ob
served that "independence is the 'in' thing today.
Micronesia appears to be no exception to this general rule.
There are at least some elements active in the islands'
social and political system which clearly maintain that
this is the only legitimate status for a future Microne
sian government.

Early in 1971 a nationalistic faction

of the Congress of Micronesia, claiming 11 of the 35
members of the legislature as adherents, organised a
nascent political movement which calls itself the Inde
pendence Coalition.

Reference has been made earlier to

another group with similar goals, namely the Micronesian
Independence Advocates, a group of Micronesian students
centered in Hawaii.

An American group, the Priends of

Micronesia, was recently organized and headquartered in
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Berkley, California.

It is composed largely of academic

activists and former Peace Corps volunteers who hope to
aid the independence movement, in large measure through
their publication, i'he Young Kicronesian.
During the second round of the status talks, the
Micronesian delegation, acting under instructions from
the Congress of Micronesia, presented independence as one
possible alternative future status.

In a report to the

Congress, the Status Commission made the following rele
vant obs ervations:

It should be noted, however, that there are
precedents in history, not least of all in the history
of the United States, in which a people, reacting to
an intolerable situation, has declared Independence
unilaterally and outright.
If such an unfortunate
situation were to arise in Micronesia, it is unlikely
that the Micronesian people would heed the restraint
of a Trusteeship Agreement in which they had no part,
and which compromised their position to accomodate
the national interests of the Administering Authority.
Surely, an outright declaration of Independence
v/ould make more difficult an already taxing change of
status.
But jrour Delegation believes that such a
declaration is not impossible.
‘
T here are precedents
and Justifications for action outside of the Trustee
ship Sysrem and your Delegation believes it should
record- its awareness of them.

There is some doubt, however, as to whether the Micronesian
Status Commission considers total independence a viable
status, either politically or economically.

A reading of

the transcripts of the negotiations suggests that indepen
dence may be viewed more as a bargaining point to be used
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to prod the U.S. into making concessions at the negotiating
table rather than as a totally credible alternative.
The American reaction to the suggestion of inde
pendence was unequivocal and immediate.

A U.S. spokesman

summarily dismissed the proposal as totally inappropriate,
saying that " . . .

the United States does not believe that

independence will be a realistically appropriate status,
considering the particular circumstances ox the Trust
Territory, for some time to come; and the United States
would be remiss in its responsibilities to say otherwise.
PREE ASSOCIATION
"Free association" is the political status that
was agreed to in principle during the last rounds of the
status negotiations.

As with most other problems, of a

political nature, the precise definition of free associa
tion status is still a matter of some dispute.

Obviously,

the hard bargaining taking place between the United States
and Micronesia will operationalize any conceptual descrip
tion provided.

As a take-off point, however, it is instruc

tive to note a definition proposed by the United Nations
in Resolution 1541 of the 15th General Assembly:
(a) free association should be the result of a
free and voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory
concerned expressed by informed and democratic processes.
It should be one which respects the individuality and
the cultural characteristics of the territory and its
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people, and retains for tlie peoples of the territory,
which is associated with an Independent State, the
freedom to modify its status through the expression of
their will hy democratic means through Constitutional
processes.
(h) 'The associate territory should have this
right to determine its internal constitution without
outside interference, in accordance with due consti
tutional processes and the freely expressed wishes of
the people. This does not preclude consultations as
appropriate or necessary under the terms of the free
association agreed upon.43
Very early in the status negotiations, as far
hack as May of 1970, the Micronesian delegation expressed
its preference for this alternative.

The primary purpose

of free association, according to the Micronesians, is to
allow the indigenous residents to:
advance from a colonial status to a new and free
status which satisfies their hasic aspirations to rule
themselves and protects their individuality and cultural
characteristics, while recognizing the practical consid
erations which must apply to a territory of small popu
lation and limited resources. The greatest advantage
in this arrangement is that it in no way hinders a
further move either to closer association with the
former administering authority, to association or
federation with neighboring states or territories,
or to sovereign independence.44
The United States delegation maintains that while such a
definition may be acceptable to the Micronesians, it has
no formal legitimacy since it is neither "a United nations
definition or a commonly accepted interpretation of the
term."^

The American contention is that the resolution

referred to is simply a "recommendation” of the U.K.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

167

General Assembly which imposes no binding commitments on
A6
any of its members.'
In very basic terms, the agreement which is emerging
will be concluded with both sides signing a formal "Compact"
stating the rights and aiities of all parties involved.
The Micronesians clearly intend to gain broad authority
in internal affairs.

The new government will be empowered

to propose a Constitution with few or no restrictions in
this area.

The primary responsibilities or priviliges

which the United States insists upon will be in the areas
of foreign affairs and defense.

Indeed, the American nego

tiators have insisted on "full authority" in these two
areas.

This fact reinforces the primary contention of

this study, i.e. that American polios?- is > and has been,
influenced by perceived security requirements and the
military value attached to Micronesia.
Another provision of the proposed agreement is
relevant to this matter, and that is the question of
terminating any compact which mas? be concluded.

Through

out the negotiations the islanders have steadfastly
maintained that "unilateral termination" by either side
at any time is the only legitimate provision agreeable.
The United States has been even more adamant in its con
tention that the pact cannot be ended unless both sides
agree to such a step.

American representatives maintain
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tliat only this alternative will insure that legitimate
American military and strategic interests in the area can
and will he protected and preserved.
A more detailed explanation of the "foreign affairs"
and "defense" functions as they would he described in the
Compact will illuminate the nature of the free- association
relationship.

Considering defense first, the American

side has indicated rather unequivocally its fundamental
objective; it is "to promote stability and peace in the
Pacific"^ and to fulfill U.S. ". .

security responsi

bilities that relate to the realities and imperatives
of its broader role in the Pacific, its United Nations
obligations, and its other international commitments."

48

In order to operationalize this objective, the United
States has demanded broad authority in these three areas:
(1) The defense of Micronesia, its people and
territory, from attack or threats thereof.
(2) The right to prevent third parties from using
the territory of Micronesia for military purposes; and
(3) The use of United States military bases which
are established in Micronesia, for the security of the
United States, and to support its responsibilities for
the maintenance of international peace and security.49
The scope of authority the United States considers essen
tial in the field of defense is suggested by references
to similar provisions in the Nest Indies Act of 1967
which describes the responsibilities of the British C-overn-
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ment in her dependencies in the West Indies.

In the

language of the Act, the British Government shall have
separate authority for

"axij matter

which in the opinion

of Her M ajesty’s Government in the United Kingdom is a
matter relating to defense.

. .

In other words, the

United States is insisting on ’’full authority” in the area
of defense.
The provision insisted upon by American negotia
tors in the field of "foreign affairs" is equally broad.

It

stipulates that "the Government of the United States shall
have full responsibility for and authority over all matters
which relate to the foreign affairs of Micronesia.

. .

In response to a Micronesian question regarding the rela
tionship of the islanders’ interests and U.S. authority inforeign affairs, Ambassador Williams was almost brutally
frank:
You have in your statement expressed difficulty in
understanding the rationale for our requirement that the
Compact should vest plenary foreign affairs authority in
the"United States.
I believe that you are asking why
from your point of view we are seeking plenary authority
in terms of Micronesian interests.
In fact, we are pro
posing that we need such authority primarily— but not
exclusively— in terms of our own interests.52
When the United States demands "full authority" in the field
of foreign affairs, Williams continued, it means specifi
cally that:
the U.S. would be responsible for Micronesia’s for
eign relations and that the U.S. would represent Micronesia
in all official government-to-government relationships
and in international organizations and conventions which
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required official government representation and parti
cipation. It would also suggest that future Micronesian
policies and positions : areas touching upon foreign
affairs would" have to be consistent with
at least not
in conflict with American foreign policy.
It should be noted that the United States has indi
cated that the Micronesian government could participate in
some limited and controlled way in the field of foreign
affairs.

In certain specific cases, the indigenous govern

ment could even exercise a veto on various actions and
commitments, e.g. international airline routes in
Micronesia."^

Since tourism from Japan and the United

States is a vital element in Micronesia's economic develop
ment, the Micronesians feel it important to retain the
freedom necessary to promote various components of the
tourism industry as they see fit, notably air travel.
Furthermore, Micronesia would be free to seek economic
aid from other nations besides the United States, !,so
long as those agreements did not constitute government55 t 0-government arrangements."
itoamples of such actions
considered appropriate by the United States might include
"commercial or foreign assistance agreements with govern
ment-owned or private trading banks and corporations,
development banks, technical assistance agencies, or
export-import banks when these do not involve direct inter
governmental obligations."^0

Under these foreign affairs

arrangements, Micronesia would be encouraged to seek
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economic and technical aid from various United Nations
agencies. 57
But American negotiators are very concerned about
problems which could arise as a result of an unclear
division ox responsibilities in foreign affairs.

They

have used "hypothetical" scenarios to illustrate their
fears.

"What if", they conjecture:

a future Micronesian Government should sign a
financial agreement with a foreign power, which it
could not meet? We might well be obligated to that
foreign power. How would we fulfill that obligation
without interfering intolerably in your internal
affairs?
What if your tariff revenues, for instance, were
to be put up by your future government as collateral
for a financial loan, something which governments
have done before— could we tolerate another govern
ment getting such control over your affairs in the
event of default or massive indebtedness?^
Such illustrations indicate why the United States
feels compelled to demand "full authority" in the field
of foreign affairs.

A single foreign policy problem

could (and probably would) be approached through different
perspectives by American and Micronesian Governments.

The

United States has world-wide foreign policy concerns which
could be adversely affected by independent Micronesian
actions.

Therefore, in the American view, it is necessary
59

to retain total control over foreign affairs.

Ambassador Williams has summarized the American position
succinctly:
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One of tlie prime interests is to maintain peace
and stability in the Pacific.
Our obligation under the
United Rations Charter and other international treaties
for insuring that the area of the world that embraces
Micronesia not become an area of international conflict,
will continue after the termination of the Trusteeship
Agreement.
The ability to meet this ongoing obligation
will be enhanced by making our responsibilities for
the overall foreign relations and defense of the area
clear to all. We feel that by retaining this respon
sibility, we will be contributing to our mutual pro
tection" and security, to stability in the Pacific Ocean.
Area which is necessary to your development and wellbeing, and to the general prospects of world peace.

The Micronesians have tentatively agreed that,
in exchange for broad authority over internal affairs,
the United States can have the full authority it demands
in the areas of foreign affairs and defense.

These are

the principles alluded to at the beginning of this chapter
on

which agreement has been reached.

However, several

other issues are still to be resolved, notably termination,
a sticky issue which could hold up final agreement for
some time, and transition procedures to govern relations
between Micronesia and the U.S. during the changeover from
the trusteeship to free association s t a t u s . T h e s e

and

other issues will be the subject of much hard bargaining
before a final Compact establishing the free association
status can be signed.
SUMMARY

Each political status considered by both sides
during the six rounds of the U.S.-Micronesian status
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negotiations has been described and analysed in this
chapter.

These alternatives include continuing the trustee

ship, commonwealth status, independence, and free associa
tion.

Although Micronesia’s political status has remained

unchanged since the trusteeship began in 1947, some move
ment has been prompted by the overwhelming anti-colonial
sentiment that exists among the international community of
nations.

There is, however, considerable sentiment in

the Mariana Islands District for a continuing close asso
ciation with the United States.

Separate talks are under

way to explore this possibility.
Commonwealth status, something similar to the posi
tion of Puerto,Rico, was proposed by the United States and
rejected by the Micronesians.

Under the terms of the

American proposal, the Commonwealth of Micronesia would
actually become a part of the United States.

'This consoli

dation would allow foreign affairs and defense to be con
trolled by the U.S. Government, while internal affairs
would be directed by the Commonwealth government.

Because

this status does not imply a link between two independent
political units, but rather a consolidation, it was rejected
by the Micronesians as unsatisfactory.
Conversely, independence was proposed as one
possible alternative by the Micronesian delegation acting
under instructions from the Congress of Micronesia.

The
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United States rejected it immediately as being totally
inappropriate for Micronesia.
Pree association, which lies somewhere between
commonwealth status and independence, has been agreed to
in principle by both sides.

It would retain Micronesia’s

identity and autonoray as a distinct political unit.
She new Micronesian government would be empowered to pro
pose a new Constitution and regulate the area's internal
affairs, while the united States would retain full authority
over foreign affairs and defense.

While these issues have

been settled in principle, such other problems as the
transition process and termination procedures remain
unresolved.
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Chapter 6

CONCLUSIONS
As noted in Chapter 1, the "basic contentions of
this study are twofold,

first, despite its commitment to

the principle of national self-determination, the United
States has been remiss in carrying out its responsibilities
as the administrator of the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands; and second, that military consideration or per
ceived requirements for U.S. national security have been
most influential in shaping U.S. polic3r in the trust
territory, that these considerations have probably elim
inated independence as an acceptable alternative for
Micronesia, and have largely determined the future status
or form of association between Micronesia and the United
States.
ACHIEVEMENTS MID FAILURES OP U.S.
POLICY IN THE TRUST TERRITORY
As for the first contention of this study, the
American commitment to Micronesia has been spelled out
in the Trusteeship Agreement.

Parts of this document,

dealing with the development of political, economic, social,
and educational goals, provide a yardstick for measuring
U.S. policy.

As pointed out in Chapter 3, at the very
179
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least, American policy can be measured by the standards
which the United States imposed on itself in the Trustee
ship Agreement,

furthermore, when the United States accepted

membership in the United Nations, it committed itself to the
goal of the Trusteeship System as specified in Chapter XII,
Article 76(b), namely !ito promote the political, economic,
social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants of
the Trust Territory and their progressive development toward
self-government or independence.”

These, then, are the

standards by which U.S. policy in Micronesia will be evaluated.
T u r n i n g first to p o l itical development,

the p r i m a r y

political i n s t i t u t i o n fostered by the a d m i n i s t e r i n g
auth o r i t y w h i c h could aid in the ach i e v e m e n t of inde p e n 
dence or s e l f - g overnment is the Congress

of Micronesia.

Its antecedents extend bach as far as August of 1956
when the Inter-District Advisory Commission was created,
with a view toward stimulating Micronesian participation
in the political system.

A series of developments cul

minated in the establishment of the Congress of Micronesia
in 1965, almost two decades after the beginning of U.S.
administration of the area.

The Congress has become the

proving ground for the territorjr’s indigenous leadership
as well as the primary vehicle for espousing Micronesian
aspirations at the U.S.-Micronesian status negotiations.
The executive bran c h of government,
still do m i n a t e d by the U.S.

however,

is

despite its efforts to increase

the l evel of M i c r o n e s i a n participation,

e s p e cially by
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appointing indigenes to head each district in the terri
tory.

However, it is the High Commissioner, still an

American, who can exercise an absolute veto over all
legislation enacted by the Micronesian Congress.

Further

more, the High Commissioner dispenses that portion of the
budget appropriated by the American Congress.

The Congress

of Micronesia, then, lias very limited powers in the financial
area, an area which will be vital to any indigenous govern
ment when a change in status occurs.
In the judicial branch of government, a similar
pattern of Micronesian involvement has developed.

At the

lower levels, Micronesian participation i s .extensive.

But

the apex of the system is still dominated by Americans,
as e,re those courts whose jurisdiction extends to areas
of U.S. military activities.
As noted above, Micronesian participation in
district government is particularly extensive, both in the
legislative and executive branches of government.

The

restrictions occur, then, not in terms of personnel, but
in terms of authority.

Any decision taken at the district

level is subject to review and veto not only by the
District Administrator, but also by the High Commissioner.
However,

it is evident that the experience gained by

Micronesians at the district level has been particularly
broad.

When the capacity of the various governmental levels

to raise funds through indigenous sources (that is, inde
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pendent of the United States)

was compared, it was found

that such funds raised at the district level outdistance
those raised by the central government.

Should a future

Micronesian government find itself cut off from American
aid, it might be difficult to persuade the disparate
districts to willingly provide the financial support
needed by the central government.

(This parochialism has

surfaced at the status negotiations, as evidenced by the
separate talks being held between representative of
the Mariana Islands District and U.S. negotiators.

But

it does appear that the other five districts working
together via the Congress of Micronesia have begun to
overcome, or at least submerge, these divisive factors.
An overall assessment of U.S. policy in the area
of political development must conclude that the most
notable success has come through the institution and
growth of the Congress of Micronesia to the point where it
has finally become a vital and active force in the Micro
nesian political system.

It is from this body that the

leaders of any future Micronesian political entity will
emerge.

'The executive branch of government has seen a

gradual increase in indigenous participation, but the
ultimate decision—making authority has not been turned
over to Micronesians.

A similar conclusion must be drawn

when the judiciary is considered.

Micronesians have
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gained some experience but tiie United States has retained
final authority w hen it seemed expedient for American
interests, especially in areas where U.S. military install
ations are involved.

Micronesians have been given broad

experience in district government, but the scope of their
authority has been restricted.

Although some progress

has been made, it must be concluded that the United States
has not consistently and successfully promoted Micronesia's
overs.ll political development tov/ard independence or
s elx-government.
In the area of economic development, American
policy followed the same lines as U.S. policy in general;
1962 marked the turning point with, however, mixed results.
This can be demonstrated by reference to Table 4- in
Chapter 3.

Appropriations before 1362 fell well under

the budget ceiling established by the U.S. Congress,
following President Kennedy's policy reassessment in 1362,
both the authorised and aptcally.

,printed levels rose dramati

The implications this held for economic develop

ment are clear.

The level of financial support before

1962 was adequate only.to meet administrative costs,
resulting in little or no economic development
increased financial support recorded after 1962 nas naci
the effect, whether intended or not, of increasing
Micronesia's dependence on continued American adminis—
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tration of the area.

As noted in Chapter 3, should

Micronesia choose independence, aid from the U.S. Congress
would he drastically curtailed.

Since U.S. appropriations

have constituted over 70 percent of the territory's budget,
an independent Micronesia would probably be forced to
operate on a budget only one-third its former size— at
best a very difficult situation.
Another indication of the shift in economic policy
relates to foreign investments in Micronesia.

Before

1962 only businesses financed by Micronesians or directly
by the U.S. government wero allowed.

After that date,

private American investment was allowed and encouraged
in an attempt to promote economic development in the
territory,

'ihe substantial level of that investment

is a further indication of the deepening dependence on the
continued American presence noted above.

However, other

foreign (i.e. non-U.S.) investment is still prohibited.
One other area of importance to economic development
concerns the recommendations of the Uathan Report examined
in Chapter 3.

It is significant to note that these

recommendations, made in 1967, have not yet been imple
mented on any broad scale.

Indeed, none of the adminis

trative reforms suggested in the report has been put
into practice.
In other specific areas, there have been some
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notable successes in relation to economic development.
'Tourism lias been selected by American policy-makers as
having great development potential.

Indeed, in tlie course

of its tremendous growth, it has replaced copra as the
territory’s largest export income earner.

Another U.S.

economic achievement in Micronesia is the Gopra Stabili
sation fund.

Its significance is due to the dependence

of Micronesia’s export trade on a single crop, copra.

As

explained earlier, the fund is designed to protect the
territory from the vicissitudes of price levels in the

world copra market.
been very successful.
sufficient.

In this area, the United States has
The fund is now financially self-

Should the United States leave the area,

the fund would be able to continue with no further support
of any hind from the Americans.
However, the encouragement of a single crop for
export, despite the Stabilisation Fund, seems subject to
question, particularly since other segments of the economy
have not been as successful.

For example, the growing

trade deficit in the territory is a cause for some concern.
The deficit, now being subsidized by the United States,
has resulted in increasing Micronesia’s need for continued
dependence on the U.S. of some hind..

In addition, American

tariff policies have been short-sighted at best.

Other

economic indicators, such as the Gross Territorial
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Product, suggest tiiat whatever economic growth has occurred
has, in large measure, resulted directly fro2~increas ed
U.S. appropriations.

Taking this and other evidence into

account, one can only conclude that American economic
policy has actually increased Micronesia’s dependence on
a continued American presence in the islands, or some form
of association which would insure the economic viability
of the territory in the future.
¥ith respect to social development, the central
thrust of American policy has beer, in the field of public
health,

financial support has followed the trend evidenced

in other policy areas, i.e. a sharply increased commitment
after 1962.

American efforts in environmental health have

been directed toward improving the water supply and sani
tary sewage disposal.

The success of projects in these

areas has been meager, as indicated by the portion of the
population which enjoys a protected water supply and
sanitary sewage disposal, which is still under ten percent.
Critics are quick to point out the concentration of these
projects in the district centers, areas where most Americans
live.
Another indication of progress, or the lack of it,
is the level of employment for wages in the territory.

If

the area is to become independent or self-governing, its
population must be self-supporting to a substantial extent.
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Although many of the islanders still function in a sub
sistence economy, the level of Micronesian employment is
increasing, Doth in absolute terms and relative to nonindigenous employment.

However, a difference exists

between the level of wages paid to indigenes as opposed
to nonindigenes• Micronesians who work for the Trust
Territory;- Government and those who are school teachers
are paid according to a separate salary schedule, which
is considerably lower than the schedule used for nonin
digenes.

Furthermore, the American Government is directly

responsible for almost 50 percent of Micronesian employ
ment for wages.

United States administration of the

islands has actually increased Micronesia.1s dependence
on a continued American presence there.
As noted in Chapter 5, a summary evaluation of
U.S. policy regarding social development is difficult.
There have been some notable successes.

For example, the

level of Micronesian employment in the area of public
health has slowly but consistently increased at a much
greater rate than nonindigenous employment.

Following

the general policy change in 1962, government expendi
tures on health, medical, and sanitation services rose
dramatically.

However, the emphasis of American policy

appears to have been somewhat misdirected.

If indepen

dence, or even self-governing status, had been the goal
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of U.S. policy, it seems reasonable to suggest tiiat emphasis
should hare been placed on developing independent programs
that would decrease Micronesia’s need for direct American
involvement, control, and direction.
the case.

This has not been

Therefore, United States policy has not been

consistently directed toward the Micronesian social devel
opment which would prepare the territory for self-govern
ment or independence.
Educational development has followed the same
pattern as development in all areas surveyed, i.e. 1962
marked the turning point.

Although intermediate education

has always been supported by the administering authority,
it was not until 1962 that the Americans assumed respon
sibility for elementary education and the salaries of
elementary school teachers.

The administration did not

become actively involved in teacher training efforts until
the general policy change.

As an outgrowth of the Micro

nesian Teacher Education Center, the Community College of
Micronesia was established in fiscal year 1970 and has
specialised in training elementary school teachers.

Other

natives are pursuing higher education abroad in a wide
range of academic disciplines.

While some attempts had

been made to provide vocational training early in the
trusteeship period, it was not until 1969 that the Micro
nesian Occupational Center was established in Koror, Palau.
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Another measure of the success of U.S. educational
policy might be the number of children attending elementary
and secondary schools.

In absolute terms the number has

certainly increased, but, when the number of school age
children is compared to the number attending school, this
assessment must change.

This proportion lias actually

decreased in recent years.

As many critics have pointed

out, the entire public secondary school system consisted
of only one high school until 1961.

Overall government

expenditures in the field of education have increased
over the years, but the per capita expenditure has remained
relatively constant.

In general, then, American policy

has not been consistently directed tov/ard Mi crone sian
educational development.
The evidence examined in this study suggests that,
in the areas of political, economic, social, and educational
development, United States policy has not been successful
in promoting Micronesia’s self-sufficiency and independence.
President Kennedy’s decision in 1962 to expand substan
tially the American commitment has not resulted in the
achievement of enough development to promote the goals of
the Trusteeship Agreement and of the United nations Charter,
namely self-government or independence.

Despite some

notable successes in each of the areas examined, the
overall effect has been to deepen Micronesia’s dependence
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on a continued American presence in the islands and
probably to rule out independence as a viable future
political status.

An understanding of the rationale

behind this trend lies in an explanation of the perceived
military and security value attached to Micronesia by U.S.
policy-makers.
MILITARY AITD SECURITY FACTORS
President Kennedy’s confidential memorandum (HASM
Ho. 145) of April 18, 1962 indicated that for military and
security reasons, U.S. policy was to be redirected toward
bringing Micronesia "into a permanent relationship with
the US within our political framework."

He instructed

Professor Anthony M. Solomon to conduct an investigation
and submit a plan for improving Micronesia's political,
economic, and social development with a view toward
achieving a permanent association with the United States
when the trusteeship ended.

The Solomon Report not only

verifies what Chapter 3 indicated about U.S. policy,
namely that s. significant change occurred in its direction
in the early 1960s, but also what Chapter 4 explained as
well, that military considerations or perceived require
ments for U.S. national security have been most influential
in shaping U.S. policy in the trust territory.
One major reason for the area's perceived strategic
value is its geographic position in the central Pacific.
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This simple fact, combined with an international situation
in which the U.S. has adopted a "low profile” in Asia as
suggested by the bixon Doctrine and in which some American
oases in the Par East have been jeopardised, account for
the importance of the military facilities which have been
built in Micronesia.

The territory’s geographic position

further explains the fact that it is being actively con
sidered as an alternate for the "forward defense line" in
the Ear East as the American position in old established
strategic bulwarks like Okinawa, the Philippines, and
Japan becomes more and more untenable.

The evidence

provided in Chapter 4 clearly indicates that Micronesia
is at least being considered as a viable alternative by
the defense establishment.
The fact that the military position reflects actual
U.S. policy has been demonstrated by noting its conformity
with the posture assumed by Ambassador Williams during the
status negotiations.

Since Williams was appointed by

President ITixon and is acting under his instructions, his
positions are authoritative statements of U.S. policy.
According to Williams and these military spokesmen, Micro
nesia is directly related to America’s broader and more
fundamental security interests in the Pacific area and
in the world.
This contention is further substantiated by the
series of plans for new military facilities in the area
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being proposed by the Department of Defense.

Its very

specific and quite tangible land needs as expressed in
the status negotiations are a further indication that the
Defense Department does envisage some future potential
need for expanding facilities in the islands.

Indeed,

Ambassador Williams has insisted that such land needs
and defense arrangements that are negotiated be formalized
in an agreement that would be separate from and independent
of a Compact describing a political settlement.

This

separate defense agreement would continue even if the
Compact were terminated— an indication that, in the eyes
of American policy-makers, the long term strategic value
of Micronesia vd.ll not decrease.
The very reason for American involvement in any
decision Micronesia makes regarding its future political
status is strategic.

During the status negotiations,

the United States has insisted that it must retain "full
authoritj-" in the areas of foreign affairs and defense.
American negotiators maintain that, should control over
these functions fall into any other than American hands,
the broader U.S. security interests noted above would be
endangered. The U.S. further insists on similar reservations
regarding Micronesia’s economic relations.

The possibilit;^

that unrestricted trade with any foreign powers might
irroeril vital American security interests compels the U.S.
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to insist 011 the right to restrict this phase of -the
islands’ external relations.
3y way of summary, military considerations or
perceived requirements for U.S. national security have
been most influential in shaping U.S. policy in the trust
territory.

The position taken by U.S. representatives

at the status negotiations indicates that strategic,
military, and security factors are vital, even compelling,
elements in the determination of Micronesia's future
political status.
FUTURE POLITICAL STATUS OE THE TRUST TERRITORY
Each alternative future political status that has
been considered by both sides during the U.S.-Micronesian
status negotiations has been described and analyzed.

These

include continuing the trusteeship, commonwealth status,
independence, and "free association".
Some change in Micronesia's political status has
been prompted by the.overwhelming anti-colonial sentiment
that exists among the international community of nations,
especially members of the Third world and the Soviet Union.
Aside from the Administrative Union of Papua and New Guinea,
Micronesia is the only one of the original eleven United
Nations trusteeships whose political status remains
unchanged.
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Some strong sentiment does exist, however, inMicronesia, especially in the Mariana Islands District,
favoring a continued close relationship with the United
States.

Indeed, efforts to achieve this end have resulted

in separate negotiations between representatives from the
Marianas and the U.S. delegation.
One of the initial American proposals was that
Micronesia become a Commonwealth and assume a status
somewhat similar to that of Puerto Rico.

The implementation

of this nlan would result in a consolidation of the terri
tory with the United States, with Micronesia actually
becoming a part of the U.S.

This proposal was particularly

suited to American military and security interests since
foreign affairs and defense would be controlled directly
by the United States.

Although internal affairs would be

administered by the Commonwealth Government, commonwealth
status would fulfill the American national security require
ments and military considerations which have played a
dominant role in U.S. administration of the trust territory
and in the status negotiations.

But the proposal was

rejected by the Micronesians since it did not imply a link
between two independent political units, but rather a
consolidation.
Although the Uicronesian delegation proposed
independence as one possible alternative future political
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status, it may viev; this suggestion more as a bargaining
point, a tool for prodding the U.S. into making concessions
at the negotiating table, than as a fully credible alterna
tive.

However, other elements in the islands are actively

promoting total independence as the only legitimate resolu
tion of the status question.

The Independence Coalition

of the Congress of Micronesia, a group of Hicronesian
students centered in Hawaii calling themselves the riicro
ne sian Independence Advocates, and an American group, the
Friends of Micronesia, are part of the minority who hold
this position.
But Hicronesian independence is not compatible with
the American national security interests cited by military
spokesmen and by Ambassador Williams during the status
negotiations.

U.S. involvement in Micronesia following

World War II was designed to prevent any foreign powers
from using it as a base for future aggressive military
action against the U.S. and its allies.

During the status

negotiations, the United States lias reasserted this objec
tive.

But, as illustrated in Chapter 4, Micronesia has a

more positive role in the American defense effort.

The

possible fallback of the "forward defense line” in Asia
caused, by growing resentment abroad toward U.S. oases and
the implementation of the Uiron Doctrine have, in the eyes
of military spokesmen and U.S. policy-makers, made

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Ki.cror.esia a vital element of American security.

The

United States rejected the suggestion of independence
immediately as being totally inappropriate for Micronesia.
Free association has been accepted in principle
as the alternative which satisfies these U.S. military and
security requirements as well as the Micronesian desire to
retain the islands' identity and autonomy as a distinct
political unit.

Although both parties have not come to

terms on a precise definition of this status, agreement
has been reached in the areas of foreign affairs, defense,
and internal affairs.

In tie Compact or agreement which

will define the powers and responsibilities of each party,
Micronesia would gain broad authority in internal affairs,
with the indigenous government setting u.p a Constitution
to regulate such matters.

In retaining "full authority"

over foreign affairs and. defense, the U.S. negotiators
maintain, as indicated in Chapter 5, that "we will be
contributing to our mutual protection and security, to
stability in the Pacific Ocean Area . . ., and to the
general prospects of world peace".

This demonstrates the

validity of the central contention of this study, namely
that military considerations or perceived requirements for
U.S. national security have been most influential in
shaping U.S. policy in the trust territory and that these
considerations have largely determined the future status or
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form of association between Micronesia and the United
States.
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Appendix A
Summary of Trust Territory Government imployment,
for the Period from 1948-1972

fiscal Year

1943
1949
1950
1351
1952
1953
1954,
. 19551
19562
1957
1958
1359
1360
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972

indigenous

1,708
*
1,050
1,539
1,564
1,262
1,410
1,613
1,842
1,927
1,883
1,832
1,920
1,393
2,622
2,979
3,685
5,686
4,071
4,233
4,578
5,114
6,211
5,996

Nonindigenous

Total

129
-X154
280
296
*
261
207
223
288
265
252
236
244
220
230
319
318
501
467
740
405
556
632
669

1,862
*
1,204
1,819
1,860

%

1,523
1,617
1,841
2,130
2,192
2,135
2,068
2,164
2,113
2,852
3,238
4,005
4,187
4,538
4,973
4,983
5,670
6,343
6,665

* These data are not available.
1. Does not include 550 employed for special projects (230
indigenous and 50 nonindigenous).
2. Does not include 503 employed for special projects (544
indigenous and. 54 nonindigenous}.
Sources:

United States, Department of State, Annual Reports
"for each res pec t ive" ”fis cal
'5-59, 75; 1351, pp. 81-87;
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Sources for Appendix A (continued)
1954, -op. 119-23; 1963, p . 242; 1964, p. 264; 1965, p. 295;
1969, pp. 205, 198; 1970~, pp. 231, 223; 1371, pp. 257, 249;
1972, pp. 252, 257; and united States, Department of the
interior, Annual Reports to the Secretary of tne Interior,
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, for each respective
fiscal year— 1954, p. 11; 1956, p. 5; 1958, p. 7; I960,
P. 13; 1962, p. 15; 1966, p. 43; 1967, p . 41; 1968, p. 34.
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ABSTRACT
The "basic contentions of this study are twofold.
First, despite its commitment to the principle of national
-■■‘ self-determination, the United States has "been remiss in
carrying out its responsibilities as the administrator of
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; and second,
that military considerations or perceived requirements
for U.S. national security have been most influential in
shaping U.S. policy in the trust territory, that these
considerations have probabljr eliminated independence as
an acceptable alternative for Micronesia, and have largely
determined the future status or form of association
between Micronesia and the United States.
The study of United States policy in Micronesia,
focusing on the effect of military and strategic influ
ence, is perhaps most amenable to traditional, descriptive
research techniques.

This study is not concerned with

constructing a theory or model of United StatesMicronesian relations.

Rather, it is an attempt simply

to describe these relations and to analyze some of the
primary factors which affect them.
The standard for evaluating the U.S. effort is
provided by the United Rations Charter and the Trustee
ship Agreement, both documents in which the United States
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pledged itself to promote political, economic, social, and
educational development with a view toward achieving
independence or self-government for Micronesia.

American

attempts to accomplish these goals have advanced through
a series of phases or stages.

The first fifteen years

of U.S. management resulted in little development in any
of the four areas examined.

Appropriations from the

U.S. Congress, a fairly accurate barometer of the American
commitment to Micronesia, remained at a consistently low
level.

In 1962 President Kennedy made a positive decision

to promote development in all areas for the purpose of
ensuring that Micronesia would ultimately become perman
ently associated with the United States in a way that
would protect vital American security interests.

The

best quantitative evidence of the implementation of this
policy shift is the dramatic and steady increase in the
level of U.S. appropriations for the territory.

However,

despite some notable successes in each of the areas
examined, the overall effect has been to deepen Micronesia’s
dependence on a continued American presence in the islands
and probably to rule out independence as a viable future
political status.
The U.S. and Micronesian representatives to the
status talks, which began in 1969, have examined each
alternative political status available including continuing
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the trusteeship, commonwealth status, independence, and
"free association".

Some change in status has been

prompted by the overwhelming anti—colonial sentiment
that exists among the international community of nations,
especially members of the Third World and the Soviet
Union.

However, the President’s personal representative

to the negotiations has indicated that any status which
does not recognize and protect American military and
securitjr interests in the islands is unacceptable.
Although the United States has consented to allow the
Micronesians to retain a certain amount of control over
internal matters, it has consistently demanded that it
retain complete authority in the areas of foreign affairs
and defense.

Despite early indications that the

Micronesians were considering total independence, they have
finally agreed in principle to "free association", a
status which would fulfill American security requirements.
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